

Close out Document

R&DP-20-1(1/68)

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

Misc coded  
6-19-69 APP  
PC-1

19 AUG 1969

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: by

REVIEWED: by

LOGGED: by

PUNCHED: by

VERIFIED: P

CARD 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Aircraft Model			AIRCRAFT BUREAU NUMBER										Reporting Custodian		Type Duty		Major Command		Time of Mishap										
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Source	Don't Count	Enemy Action	Mission Modif.	Basic Mission	Design Number	Series Symbol	Model Code															CONDITION		LOCAL TIME										
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day												24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41									
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
69	0	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	1		L			C	0	0	1	A	7	2	1	4	6	0	1	9	5	2	2	3	2	5	2	4	0	1	0	3		

Location										FAC. RWAY DESCRIP.										FAC. SHIP DESCRIP.										Trans. Code		Card Number						
NAME CODE										WAS DUTY RWAY USED?										LOC'N																		
Acct. Dmg.	Acft. Dmg.	Acct. Inj.	Acft. Inj.	Hull Number	Kind of Flight	Clearance	Bearing From	Dist. From	Distance	Area	Runway Heading	Length	Ship Type	Ship Course	Ship Speed	Initial Contact	Final Rest	Trans. Code		Card Number																		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
C	C	G	G	A	3	8	3	A	4	1	G	I	N	A	P	L	E			A															A		1	

(b) (6)

CLOSED  
30 JUN 1970

1233

CARD 2

RELATIVE WIND				Alt. of Emergency		Acft. Gross Weight		Fiscal Year		Fleets and Maws.																												
Direction	Velocity	Density Altitude		Above Terrain	Pressure Altitude																																	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	
1	8	0	6				A	0	0				0	0	1	8	0		6	9	0	6																

PROPERTY DAMAGE COST				Aircraft Injury Summary																Trans. Code		Card Number								
Gov't.		Non Gov't.		Total Occupants This Acft.		TOTAL INJURIES "A" "U" "L"		"A" Injuries		"U" Injuries		"L" Injuries																		
Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Trans. Code		Card Number														
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2																	A		2	

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 8

## AVN NAVSAFEEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: By REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_

LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_

PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_

VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd)																		No. Occupants All Acft. Involved												
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	"B" Injuries		"C" Injuries		"D" Injuries		"E" Injuries		"F" Injuries		"G" Injuries		Total Injuries																							
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day				Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy																				
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	9	0	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	1																					1	2			1	2			0	0	2

ESCAPE SYS. DATA										Component Separated From Aircraft	Pri Acct. Type	Pri Phase of Operation	1st Acct. Type	1st Phase of Operation	2nd Acct. Type	2nd Phase of Operation	Trans. Code	Card No.																			
Sys.	Comp- onent	Spec. Data																																			
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																			K	2	5	2			E	6	3	3	5	K	2	5	2	A	1	3	1

										Contributing Causes				Pilot Error Causal Fac.			Other Personnel Causal Factor			Inv. Mat. Comp.																	
3rd Acct. Type		3rd Phase of Operation		Type Operations						First			Second			Third			Pilot Factor After Fact.			First			Second			Third			Other Pers. Factor After Fact			1st Causal Factor			
Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Gross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.		
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
							2	3	2	1	6					X	W	Y	3					D	5	D	7	A	8			L	0	2	0	0	

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.)										Material Fact. After Fact				Acft. Design Comp. Causal Factor				DESIGN C.F.		Trans. Code	Card No.									
2nd Causal Factor				3rd Causal Factor						Gross Ref.		Compo- nent		Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Special Equipment Pilot Equipment												
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																											A	0	4	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1CODE SHEET 2 OF 8

CODED: hgr REVIEWED \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

CARD 6CAPRI 8

CODE SHEET 3 OF 8



## NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: log REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

CARD 9

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Aircraft Data																		Power Plant Model Number										
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	1st Flight After Maint.	D. I. R.	Tour	Hours Since Acceptance	Since Last Insp.			Since Last Par/O'Haul																							
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day	Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number								Type	Hours	Days	Activity	Hours	Months																					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	
6	9	0	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	1			8	7	5	8	5	A			9		3	C				9											

Power Plant Serial Number											Primary Involved Material Component																		Trans. Code		Card Number									
Power Plant Serial Number											Manufacturers Part Number											Total Hours			Since Last Par/O'Haul															
Power Plant Serial Number											Manufacturers Part Number											Total Hours			Activity	Number	Hours													
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

CARD 10

Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd)											Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component																											
Since Last Check Perf.											Manufacturers Part Number											Total Hours			Since Last Par/O'Haul			Since Last Check Perf.										
Type	Hours	Days	Manufacturers Part Number											Total Hours			Activity	Number	Hours	Type	Hours	Days																
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	

Power Plant Serial Number											Primary Involved Material Component																		Trans. Code		Card Number								
Power Plant Serial Number											Manufacturers Part Number											Total Hours			Since Last Par/O'Haul														
Power Plant Serial Number											Manufacturers Part Number											Total Hours			Activity	Number	Hours												
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80									

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1CODE SHEET 4 OF 8



## NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: by REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

CARD 11

**RECORD IDENTIFICATION**

Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09
6	9	0	3	2	2	1	0	1

**Controlling LSO's Carrier Pass Description**

Start						Middle						In-Close						Ramp									
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39

**CLCPD (cont'd)**

**TOUCH-DOWN**

Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position													Trans. Code	Card Number																					
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58			59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79

CARD 12

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49										
												File or Serial Number (Pilot)												Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number														
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80																	
												(b) (6)												4	2	9	5	A	2	G	1	A	1	2	1												

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1  
  
 CODE SHEET 58 OF 8

## NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: LP REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

CARD 13

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model		Number of																					
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Pilot Factor Inv.	Service Tour	Instrument Card	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Inst. Hours Last 3 Months	Nite Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Helo Time	Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model																	
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	9	0	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	1	1	3				0	0					2	0	0	8	9	9	0	8	2	5	0	6			A	A	3	9	9
Carrier Landings											File or Serial Number (Co-Pilot)		Rank/Rate		Br. of Service		Age		Yrs. D.N.A.		Status		Position		Inj. to Indiv.		Abandon A/C		Pilot Factor Involved		Service Tour		Instr. Card		Trans. Code		Card Number			
Total Nite This Model	This Model Day Last 30 Days	This Model Nite Last 30 Days																																						
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80		
2	4															(b) (6)							2	1	K	J	C	I	G	1	3		3	A	1	3				

CARD 14

Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model		Number of Carrier Landings																													
Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Inst. Hours Last 3 Months	Nite Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Helo Time	Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	Total Nite This Model	This Model Day Last 30 Days	This Model Nite Last 30 Days																				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
	0	0				4	4	0	5	9	9	0	5	1	7	1	6					B	B	4	7	0	0	1									
File or Serial Number (Instr. Plt. in Other A/C)								Rank/Rate		Br. of Service		Age		Yrs. D.N.A.		Status		Position		Inj. to Indiv.		Abandon A/C		Pilot Factor Involved		Service Tour		Instr. Card		Trans. Code		Card Number					
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80							
																											A	1	4								

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1CODE SHEET 6 OF 8



## AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: hgc REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of Carrier															
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Inst. Hours Last 3 Months	Nite Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Helo Time	Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	Total Nite This Model																			
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	
6	9	0	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	1																														
Landings				This Individual in Acft.	Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.)											Number of Personnel Records	Trans. Code				Card Number																			
This Model Day Last 30 Days	This Model Nite Last 30 Days																																							
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	
																																						1	5	8

CARD 16

File or Serial Number (All Persons)																			Name																			Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49										
(b) (6)																																						4	2	9	5	A	2	G	1	6	5
Equip 1					Equip 2					Equip 3					Equip 4					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number																									
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data																												
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80																	
																																					1	6	8								

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1CODE SHEET 7 OF 8



## AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: 92 REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of Carrier →														
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Inst. Hours Last 3 Months	Nite Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Helo Time	Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	Total Nite This Model																		
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	9	0	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	1																													
Landings			This Individual in Acft.	Name (Instr. Pit. in Other Acft.)																	Number of Personnel Records	Trans. Code	Card Number																
This Model Day Last 30 Days	This Model Nite Last 30 Days																																						
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					1	5	8

CARD 16

P	File or Serial Number (All Persons)																	Name																	Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65										
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49															
P	(b) (6)																																																				
Equip 1					Equip 2					Equip 3					Equip 4					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number																															
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data																																						
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80																							

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1CODE SHEET 8 OF 8

## GENERAL DATA SECTION NARRATIVE BRIEF

I. D. Number	690322141	10 Typ Brief	13 Narr File I. D.	69 Cl.	70 Orig. Use	24 23 Tot Cds	77 Trans. Code
1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log			
Common Fields to All Cards							

CLASS

CODE

1 - Non-Class

2 - Conf.

CARD NO. CODED 10/2 REVIEWED \_\_\_\_\_ KEY PUNCHED \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

11 12 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

0 1 PLT OF ACFT, AFTER GEAR RETRACTION FOLLOWING NIGHT CA

0 2 T SHOT, NOTED UNSAFE NOSE GEAR INDIC. HE EXTENDED LDG

0 3 , WHICH INDICATED DOWN & LOCKED. UPON RECM OF PLANE C

0 4 DR, IN CO-PLT POSIT, HE RETRACTED LDG. UNSAFE NOSE GE

0 5 AR INDIC WAS STILL OBSR. AFTER EXTENDING THE LDG ABAT

0 6 N, NOSE GEAR REMAINED JAMMED UP IN WHEEL WELL. ATTEMP

0 7 TS TO DISLODGE GEAR WERE UNSUCCESSFUL; ACFT WAS DIVER

0 8 TED TO SHORE BASE. AEM MADE ON FORMED RWY (FOAM LENGT

0 9 H INADEQ); SUBST DAMAGE TO ACFT RESULTED. INVES REVD

1 0 CAT SHOT WAS NORMAL. POSIT OF NOSE GEAR, BEFORE T/O,

1 1 HAD BEEN CHECKED BY SAFETY PETTY OFFICER. HOWEVER, I

1 2 T WAS DARK AND VIS WAS GREATLY RESTRICTED. IT IS POSS

1 3 FOR NOSE GEAR TO VIS INDICATE PROPER ALIGNMENT, WITH

1 4 ROLLERS NOT ENGAGED IN YOKE. WITH NO OTHER CAUSE FAC

1 5 TORS NOTED, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS IS WHAT OCCURRED

1 6 . PRI CAUSE, PLT (PLANE CDR) - JUDGMENT ERROR IN RECM AD

1 7 G TO BE RAISED, AFTER INDIC OF MALF. CONTRA, PLTS - IN

1 8 ADEQUATE EVALUATION OF EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDE

1 9 NG THE UNSAFE NOSE GEAR INDIC. OTHER PERSE-FAC SUPPORT

2 0 (SAFETY PETTY OFFICER) NOT INSURING PROPER NOSE GEAR

11 12 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

CARD NO.

# NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/22 (REV. 5/69) GENERAL DATA SECTION NARRATIVE BRIEF

I. D. Number	69	03	22	10	1	N	N	N	L				24	A
1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13 Narr	14 File	15 I. D.	69 Cl.	70 Orig.	71 Use	72 73	74 Tot-Cds	77 78 Trans. Code

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS

CODE

1 - Non-Class

2 - Conf.

CARD NO. CODED 101 REVIEWED \_\_\_\_\_ KEY PUNCHED \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

11 12 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

01 ALIGNMENT. OTHER PERS-FAE SUPPORT (CRASH CREW AT FLD)

02 PROVIDING LESS THAN MIN LENGTH OF FORMED AREA AS REQD

03 BY NATOPS. SUPV PERS-BASE OPERATIONS NOT INSURING PR

04 OPER LENGTH OF FORMED AREA WAS MADE.

05 G TO BE RAISED, AFTER INDIC OF MALF. CONTRIB, OTHER P

06 ERS (CV FAE SUPPORT) SAFETY PETTY OFFICER - NOT INSURING

07 PROPER NOSE GEAR ALIGNMENT. OTHER PERS (1) FLD FAE S

08 UPPORT (CRASH CREW) - PROVIDED LESS THAN MINIMUM OF FO

09 RMED AREA AS REQUIRED BY NATOPS. (2) SUPV (BASE OPERAT

10 IONS) - FAILED TO INSURE THAT FOAM HAD BEEN LAID IN AC

11 12 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

13 CORDANCE WITH NATOPS REQUIREMENTS.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

11 12 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

CARD NO.



FAA

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION DIRECTOR CARD

NAVSAFECEN 3750 - 1/20 (NEW 3/69)

(b) (6)

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODING: 00 REVIEWED: HP<sup>8-1</sup> LOGGED:      PUNCHED: B VERIFIED: R 28 AUG 1969

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																															Corrected Mishap Identification Number	
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Trans Code	No. of Aircraft in Mishap																						
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																														
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30			
69	6	3	22			1	4	1	6	0		A	0	1																		

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 13

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 1(ACFT)

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/21 (New 3/69)

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODING: RE REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

Card 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Model Acft										Aircraft Bureau Number													
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Format No.	Trans Code	Card Number	Reporting Custodian	Act. Damage	Total Pers. This Acft	Mission Modif	Basic Mission	Design No	Series Symbol																			
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
6	9	4	3	2	2	1	6	1	4	1	1	A	8	1		S	2	2	C	4				C	4	4	1	A	1	4	6	4	1	9
Altitude of Emergency											Time At Alt					Time of Mishap		DURATION OF FLIGHT																
Terrain Clearance			Cabin Altitude			Ambient Altitude			At Cabin Altitude		At Ambient Altitude		Place in Formation		Cloud Condition		Horizon Condition																	
36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63							
																					A	1	3	4	4	1	1							

Card 2

Format No.	Trans Code	Card Number	Kind of Flight	Narrative Identification																	Combat Environment	Primary Cause	Enemy Action			
				Safety and Survival							Bio-Med															
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34				
1	A	8	2		3	A	4	Y						0	0	2	D				1					

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 13

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

1

I.D. Number	6	9	0	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	1	2	A	0	1	12
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	20
	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Typ	Log	A/C	NO.	Format No.	Transaction	Pers	Sequence	Tot. No.	Cards			

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 3 OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

## COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
01		1 3		FILE/SERVICE NO. 01	0 0 2 2	0 7	(b) (6)
		1 3		NAME	0 0 2 9	0 7	
		0 9		NAME (CONT)	0 0 3 6	0 3	
		0 7		RANK/RATE	0 0 3 9	0 1	
		0 7		BRANCH OF SERVICE	0 0 4 0	0 1	
		0 7		STATUS 02	0 0 4 1	0 1	
02		0 7		INJURY	0 0 4 2	0 1	
		0 7		DISPOSITION	0 0 4 3	0 1	
		0 8		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0 0 4 4	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS QUARTERS	0 0 4 6	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS GROUNDED	0 0 4 8	0 2	
		0 9		UNCONSCIOUS	0 0 5 0	0 3	
		0 8		AMNESIA	0 0 5 3	0 2	
		0 8		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0 0 5 5	0 2	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	0 0 5 7	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 6 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0 0 7 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0 0 7 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 8 5	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0 0 9 2	0 7	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0 0 9 9	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 0 6	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0 1 1 3	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0 1 2 0	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 2 7	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0 1 3 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0 1 4 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 4 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0 1 5 5	0 7	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0 1 6 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0 1 6 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0 1 7 4	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0 1 8 0	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0 1 8 6	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0 1 9 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0 1 9 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0 2 0 4	0 6	
		0 8		X-RAY	0 2 1 0	0 2	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0 2 1 2	0 3	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0 2 1 5	0 3	



# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

2

I.D. Number	6	9	4	3	2	2	1	4	1	4	1	2	A	4	1		
Yr.	Mo.	Day	Typ	Log	A/C	NO.	Format No.	Transaction	Pers	Sequence	Tot. No	21					

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/11 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 4

OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

PERSONNEL 1

OF 2

CODED: REVIEWED: LOGGED: PUNCHED: VERIFIED:

## COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	0 9			PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 3	0 2 1 8 0 3		
	0 8			AUTOPSY	0 2 2 1 0 2		
	1 0			MATERIAL TO AFIP	0 2 2 3 0 4		
	0 7			AFIP REPORT	0 2 2 7 0 1		
	1 1			ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 1	0 2 2 8 0 5		
	1 1			ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 2	0 2 3 3 0 5		
	1 1			ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 3	0 2 3 8 0 5		
	1 1			ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 4	0 2 4 3 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 1	0 2 4 8 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 2	0 2 5 3 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 3	0 2 5 8 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 4	0 2 6 3 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 5	0 2 6 8 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 6	0 2 7 3 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 7	0 2 7 8 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 8	0 2 8 3 0 5		
	0 8			ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL	0 2 8 8 0 2		
	1 2			LEAVE INFO. DATE LAST LEAVE	0 2 9 0 0 6		
	0 9			LEAVE INFO. NO. OF DAYS/TYPE	0 2 9 6 0 3		
	1 2			DATE LAST PREV. FLIGHT	0 2 9 9 0 6		

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	0 9			HOURS FLOWN LAST 24	0 3 0 5 0 3		
	0 9			HOURS FLOWN LAST 48	0 3 0 8 0 3		
	1 0			MISSIONS FLOWN LAST 24 (21/48 12)	0 3 1 1 0 4		
	1 2			HOURS WORKED LAST 24 (13/48 13)	0 3 1 5 0 6		
	1 2			HOURS SLEPT LAST 24 (31/48 13)	0 3 2 1 0 6		
	0 9			HOURS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 2 7 0 3		
	0 9			HOURS AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 3 0 0 3		
	0 9			HOURS DURATION LAST SLEEP	0 3 3 3 0 3		
	0 8			TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 3 6 0 2		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 1	0 3 3 8 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 2	0 3 4 4 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 3	0 3 5 0 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 4	0 3 5 6 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 5	0 3 6 2 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 6	0 3 6 8 0 6		
	0 8			AGE	0 3 7 4 0 2		
	0 8			HEIGHT	0 3 7 6 0 2		
	0 9			WEIGHT	0 3 7 8 0 3		
	0 9			SITTING HEIGHT	0 3 8 1 0 3		
	0 9			TRUNK HEIGHT	0 3 8 4 0 3		

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

4

I.D. Number												2		A		01				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	20	21				
Yr.			Mo.		Day		TYP		Log		A/C NO		Format No.		Transaction		Pers Sequence		Tot. No. Cards	

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/13 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 5 OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

## COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 13	0 6 0 3 0 7		
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0 6 1 0 0 6		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0 6 1 6 0 4		
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 14	0 6 2 0 0 7		
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0 6 2 7 0 6		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0 6 3 3 0 4		
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 15	0 6 3 7 0 7		
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0 6 4 4 0 6		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0 6 5 0 0 4		
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 16	0 6 5 4 0 7		
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0 6 6 1 0 6		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0 6 6 7 0 4		
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 17	0 6 7 1 0 7		
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0 6 7 8 0 6		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0 6 8 4 0 4		
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 18	0 6 8 8 0 7		
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0 6 9 5 0 6		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0 7 0 1 0 4		
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 19	0 7 0 5 0 7		
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0 7 1 2 0 6		

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0 7 1 8 0 4		
		1 3		EQUIPMENT NO. 20	0 7 2 2 0 7		
		1 2		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0 7 2 9 0 6		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0 7 3 5 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 21	0 7 3 9 0 4		01 01
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 22	0 7 4 3 0 4		06 9 9
7 6		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 23	0 7 4 7 0 4		09 01
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 24	0 7 5 1 0 4		16 9 9
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 25	0 7 5 5 0 4		02 9 9
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 26	0 7 5 9 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 27	0 7 6 3 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 28	0 7 6 7 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 29	0 7 7 1 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 30	0 7 7 5 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 31	0 7 7 9 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 32	0 7 8 3 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 33	0 7 8 7 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 34	0 7 9 1 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 35	0 7 9 5 0 4		
		1 0		EQUIPMENT NO. 36	0 7 9 9 0 4		

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

5

I.D. Number												13	14	15	20	21
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	20	21
Yr. Mo. Day Typ Log												A/C NO.	Format No.	Transaction	Pers Sequence	Tot No. Cards

NAVSAFECEN 3750 1/14 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 6

OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

PERSONNEL 1

OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ UNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

## COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	1 0			EQUIPMENT NO. 37	0 8 0 3	0 4	
	1 0			EQUIPMENT NO. 38	0 8 0 7	0 4	
	1 0			EQUIPMENT NO. 39	0 8 1 1	0 4	
	0			EQUIPMENT NO. 40	0 8 1 5	0 4	
	1 1			LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT	0 8 1 9	0 5	
	0 9			METHOD OF ESCAPE <u>09</u>	0 8 2 4	0 3	
	0 7			INTENT FOR ESCAPE	0 8 2 7	0 1	
<u>07</u>	0 7			EXIT USED	0 8 2 8	0 1	
	0 7			COCKPIT CONDITION	0 8 2 9	0 1	
	0 8			ORDER OF ESCAPE	0 8 3 0	0 2	
	0 9			REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE <u>10</u>	0 8 3 2	0 3	
	0 8			COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO ESCAPE	0 8 3 5	0 2	
	1 0			NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ESCAPES	0 8 3 7	0 4	
	0 9			TERRAIN OF LANDING OR CRASH SITE	0 8 4 1	0 3	
	1 3			AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE	0 8 4 4	0 7	
	0 8			AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE CONTINUED	0 8 5 1	0 2	
	1 4			EJT. TRAINING/LECTURES	0 8 5 3	0 7	
<u>08</u>	1 4			EJT. TRAINING/FILMS <u>11</u>	0 8 6 0	0 7	
	1 4			EJT. TRAINING/UNARMED SEAT	0 8 6 7	0 7	
	1 4			EJT. TRAINING/ARMED SEAT	0 8 7 4	0 7	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	0 9			JUMP/PARASAIL/OTHER SCHOOL ROLE	0 8 8 1	0 3	
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB 1 & 2	0 8 8 4	0 6	
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB 3 & 4	0 8 9 0	0 6	
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB 1 & 2	0 8 9 6	0 6	
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB 3 & 4	0 9 0 2	0 6	
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB 1 & 2	0 9 0 8	0 6	
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB 3 & 4	0 9 1 4	0 6	
	1 1			TIME FROM EMER. UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEM.	0 9 2 0	0 5	
	0 9			REASON FOR DELAY	0 9 2 5	0 3	
	1 1			TERRAIN CLEAR AT ESCAPE	0 9 2 8	0 5	
	1 1			TERRAIN CLEAR AT PRCHT. OPENING	0 9 3 3	0 5	
	0 9			AIR SPEED	0 9 3 8	0 3	
	0 9			GROUND SPEED	0 9 4 1	0 3	
	0 7			PRCHT. DID NOT OPEN	0 9 4 4	0 1	
	1 2			PROTECTIVE HELMET CHINSTRAP/VISOR	0 9 4 5	0 6	
	0 8			CHINSTRAP NAPE STRAP	0 9 5 1	0 2	
	0 8			ZERO LANYARD	0 9 5 3	0 2	
	0 7			AUTO LAP BELT RELEASE	0 9 5 5	0 1	
	1 0			ACFT. CANOPY REMOVAL	0 9 5 6	0 4	
	0 9			EJECTION	0 9 6 0	0 3	



# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

6

I.D. Number												A		1		2				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Yr.		Mo.		Day		Typ		Log		A/C NO.		Format No.		Transaction		Pers Sequence		Tot. No. Cards		

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/15 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 7 OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

## COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES	CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 0		BODY POSITION	0 9 6 3 0 4					1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING GENERAL	1 0 4 6 0 5		
		0 9		SEAT POSITION/SEPAR TYPE SEPARATION	0 9 6 7 0 3					1 3		CONDITIONS AT SURVIVAL/ RESCUE SITE (TEMP WINDS)	1 0 5 1 0 7		
		1 2		Parachute Data Deploy/Open Shock/Oscillat	0 9 7 0 0 6					1 0		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (WAVES)	1 0 5 8 0 4		
		1 0		PARACHUTE DAMAGE	0 9 7 6 0 4					1 0		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (TERRAIN WEATHER)	1 0 6 2 0 4		
		1 0		PARACHUTE DAMAGE CAUSE	0 9 8 0 0 4					1 1		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO ALERT (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 6 6 0 5		
		0 7		DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING	0 9 8 4 0 1					1 0		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 1	1 0 7 1 0 4		
		1 1		LANDING CONDITIONS (WEIGHT WINDS)	0 9 8 5 0 5					1 0		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 2	1 0 7 5 0 4		
		0 9		DRAWN BY CHUTE DISTANCE DRAWN	0 9 9 0 0 3					1 1		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (RESC VEH)	1 0 7 9 0 5		
		1 0		LANDING POSITION	0 9 9 3 0 4					1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 0 8 4 0 4		
		0 9		DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING	0 9 9 7 0 3					1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 0 8 8 0 4		
		0 7		CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS	1 0 0 0 0 1					1 1		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 9 2 0 5		
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING SWIM	1 0 0 1 0 5		4764			1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 0 9 7 0 4		
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING DILBERT DUNK	1 0 0 6 0 5		4764			1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 1 0 1 0 4		
		1 1		PARACHUTE DRAG	1 0 1 1 0 5		4764			1 1		TIME LOCATE TO REACH (RESCUE VEHICLE)	1 1 0 5 0 5		
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSERD COCKPIT 12	1 0 1 6 0 5		4764			1 0		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 1 1 0 0 4		
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSERD SEAT	1 0 2 1 0 5		4764			1 0		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 1 1 4 0 4		
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN JUNGLE	1 0 2 6 0 5		4764			1 1		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE/ABANDON	1 1 1 8 0 5		
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN ARCTIC	1 0 3 1 0 5					1 0		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE COMPLETE	1 1 2 3 0 4		
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN DESERT	1 0 3 6 0 5					1 0		TIME IN WATER	1 1 2 7 0 4		
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN MOUNTAIN	1 0 4 1 0 5					1 0		TIME IN RAFT	1 1 3 1 0 4		

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

1

I.D. Number		6	9	0	3	2	2	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	0	2	1	2
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
		Yr.	Mo.		Day		Typ	Log	A/C NO.		Format No.	Transaction	Pers Sequence	Tot No. Cards				

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 8

OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

PERSONNEL 2

OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
01		1 3		FILE/SERVICE NO. 01	0 0 2 2	0 7	(b) (6)
		1 3		NAME	0 0 2 9	0 7	
		0 9		NAME (CONT)	0 0 3 6	0 3	
		0 7		RANK/RATE	0 0 3 9	0 1	
		0 7		BRANCH OF SERVICE 02	0 0 4 0	0 1	
		0 7		STATUS	0 0 4 1	0 1	
02		0 7		INJURY	0 0 4 2	0 1	
		0 7		DISPOSITION	0 0 4 3	0 1	
		0 8		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0 0 4 4	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS QUARTERS	0 0 4 6	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS GROUNDED	0 0 4 8	0 2	
		0 9		UNCONSCIOUS	0 0 5 0	0 3	
		0 8		AMNESIA	0 0 5 3	0 2	
		0 8		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0 0 5 5	0 2	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	0 0 5 7	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 6 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0 0 7 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0 0 7 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 8 5	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0 0 9 2	0 7	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0 0 9 9	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 0 6	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0 1 1 3	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0 1 2 0	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 2 7	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0 1 3 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0 1 4 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 4 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0 1 5 5	0 7	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0 1 6 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0 1 6 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0 1 7 4	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0 1 8 0	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0 1 8 6	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0 1 9 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0 1 9 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0 2 0 4	0 6	
		0 8		X-RAY	0 2 1 0	0 2	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0 2 1 2	0 3	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0 2 1 5	0 3	

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

2

I.D. Number												2		A		42	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	20	21	
Yr.				Mo.		Day		Typ	Log		A/C NO.	Format No.	Transaction	Pers Sequence	Tot. No. Cards		

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/11 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 9 OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

## COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	0 9			PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 3	0 2 1 8 0 3		
	0 8			AUTOPSY	0 2 2 1 0 2		
	1 0			MATERIAL TO AFIP	0 2 2 3 0 4		
	0 7			AFIP REPORT	0 2 2 7 0 1		
	1 1			ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 1	0 2 2 8 0 5		
	1 1			ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 2	0 2 3 3 0 5		
	1 1			ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 3	0 2 3 8 0 5		
	1 1			ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 4	0 2 4 3 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 1	0 2 4 8 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 2	0 2 5 3 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 3	0 2 5 8 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 4	0 2 6 3 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 5	0 2 6 8 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 6	0 2 7 3 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 7	0 2 7 8 0 5		
	1 1			PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 8	0 2 8 3 0 5		
0 3	0 8			ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL	0 2 8 8 0 2		
	1 2			LEAVE INFO - DATE LAST LEAVE	0 2 9 0 0 6		
	0 9			LEAVE INFO - NO. OF DAYS/TYPE	0 2 9 6 0 3		
	1 2			DATE LAST PREV. FLIGHT	0 2 9 9 0 6		

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	0 9			HOURS FLOWN LAST 24	0 3 0 5 0 3		
	0 9			HOURS FLOWN LAST 48	0 3 0 8 0 3		
	1 0			MISSIONS FLOWN LAST 24 (2)/48 (2)	0 3 1 1 0 4		
	1 2			HOURS WORKED LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0 3 1 5 0 6		
7-1	1 2			HOURS SLEPT LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0 3 2 1 0 6		
	0 9			HOURS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 2 7 0 3		
	0 9			HOURS AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 3 0 0 3		
	0 9			HOURS DURATION LAST SLEEP	0 3 3 3 0 3		
	0 8			TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 3 6 0 2		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 1	0 3 3 8 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 2	0 3 4 4 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 3	0 3 5 0 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 4	0 3 5 6 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 5	0 3 6 2 0 6		
	1 2			PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 6	0 3 6 8 0 6		
2-5	0 8			AGE	0 3 7 4 0 2		
	0 8			HEIGHT	0 3 7 6 0 2		
	0 9			WEIGHT	0 3 7 8 0 3		
	0 9			SITTING HEIGHT	0 3 8 1 0 3		
	0 9			TRUNK HEIGHT	0 3 8 4 0 3		



# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

4

I.D. Number	6	9	4	3	2	2	1	4	1	1	2	A	4	2		
Yr.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	20
Mo.																
Day																
Typ																
Log																
A/C NO.																
Format No.																
Transaction																
Pers Sequence																
Tot No Cards																

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/13 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 10 OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES	CD NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	1	3		EQUIPMENT NO. 13	0 6 0 3 0 7				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0 7 1 8 0 4		
	1	2		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0 6 1 0 0 6				1	3		EQUIPMENT NO. 20	0 7 2 2 0 7		
	1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0 6 1 6 0 4				1	2		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0 7 2 9 0 6		
	1	3		EQUIPMENT NO. 14	0 6 2 0 0 7				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0 7 3 5 0 4		
	1	2		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0 6 2 7 0 6				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 21	0 7 3 9 0 4		
	1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0 6 3 3 0 4				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 22	0 7 4 3 0 4		
	1	3		EQUIPMENT NO. 15	0 6 3 7 0 7				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 23	0 7 4 7 0 4		
	1	2		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0 6 4 4 0 6				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 24	0 7 5 1 0 4		
	1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0 6 5 0 0 4				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 25	0 7 5 5 0 4		
	1	3		EQUIPMENT NO. 16	0 6 5 4 0 7				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 26	0 7 5 9 0 4		
	1	2		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0 6 6 1 0 6				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 27	0 7 6 3 0 4		
	1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0 6 6 7 0 4				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 28	0 7 6 7 0 4		
	1	3		EQUIPMENT NO. 17	0 6 7 1 0 7				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 29	0 7 7 1 0 4		
	1	2		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0 6 7 8 0 6				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 30	0 7 7 5 0 4		
	1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0 6 8 4 0 4				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 31	0 7 7 9 0 4		
	1	3		EQUIPMENT NO. 18	0 6 8 8 0 7				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 32	0 7 8 3 0 4		
	1	2		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0 6 9 5 0 6				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 33	0 7 8 7 0 4		
	1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0 7 0 1 0 4				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 34	0 7 9 1 0 4		
	1	3		EQUIPMENT NO. 19	0 7 0 5 0 7				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 35	0 7 9 5 0 4		
	1	2		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0 7 1 2 0 6				1	0		EQUIPMENT NO. 36	0 7 9 9 0 4		

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

5

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/14 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 11

OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

PERSONNEL 2

OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

I.D. Number												2		A		42	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	20	21	
Yr.			Mo.			Day			A/C NO			Format No			Transaction		

## COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	1 0			EQUIPMENT NO. 37	0 8 0 3 0 4		
	1 0			EQUIPMENT NO. 38	0 8 0 7 0 4		
	1 0			EQUIPMENT NO. 39	0 8 1 1 0 4		
	0			EQUIPMENT NO. 40	0 8 1 5 0 4		
	1 1			LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT	0 8 1 9 0 5		
	0 9			METHOD OF ESCAPE <u>09</u>	0 8 2 4 0 3		
	0 7			INTENT FOR ESCAPE	0 8 2 7 0 1		
	0 7			EXIT USED	0 8 2 8 0 1		
	0 7			COCKPIT CONDITION	0 8 2 9 0 1		
	0 8			ORDER OF ESCAPE	0 8 3 0 0 2		
	0 9			REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE <u>10</u>	0 8 3 2 0 3		
	0 8			COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO ESCAPE	0 8 3 5 0 2		
	1 0			NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ESCAPES	0 8 3 7 0 4		
	0 9			TERRAIN OF LANDING OR CRASH SITE	0 8 4 1 0 3		
	1 3			AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE	0 8 4 4 0 7		
	0 8			AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE CONTINUED	0 8 5 1 0 2		
	1 4			EJT. TRAINING/LECTURES	0 8 5 3 0 7		
	1 4			EJT. TRAINING/FILMS <u>11</u>	0 8 6 0 0 7		
	1 4			EJT. TRAINING/UNARMED SEAT	0 8 6 7 0 7		
	1 4			EJT. TRAINING/ARMED SEAT	0 8 7 4 0 7		

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	0 9			JUMP/PARASAIL/OTHER SCHOOL ROLE	0 8 8 1 0 3		
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB 1 & 2	0 8 8 4 0 6		
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB 3 & 4	0 8 9 0 0 6		
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB 1 & 2	0 8 9 6 0 6		
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB 3 & 4	0 9 0 2 0 6		
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB 1 & 2	0 9 0 8 0 6		
	1 2			EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB 3 & 4	0 9 1 4 0 6		
	1 1			TIME FROM EMER UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEM	0 9 2 0 0 5		
	0 9			REASON FOR DELAY	0 9 2 5 0 3		
	1 1			TERRAIN CLEAR AT ESCAPE	0 9 2 8 0 5		
	1 1			TERRAIN CLEAR AT PRIOR OPENING	0 9 3 3 0 5		
	0 9			AIR SPEED	0 9 3 8 0 3		
	0 9			GROUND SPEED	0 9 4 1 0 3		
	0 7			PRCHT. DID NOT OPEN	0 9 4 4 0 1		
	1 2			PROTECTIVE HELMET CHINSTRAP/VISOR	0 9 4 5 0 6		
	0 8			CHIN STRAP NAPE STRAP	0 9 5 1 0 2		
	0 8			ZERO LANYARD	0 9 5 3 0 2		
	0 7			AUTO LAP BELT RELEASE	0 9 5 5 0 1		
	1 0			ACFT. CANOPY REMOVAL	0 9 5 6 0 4		
	0 9			EJECTION	0 9 6 0 0 3		

# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

6

I.D. Number	6	9	4	3	2	2	1	4	1	4	1	2	A	2	2	1	2
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	20	21
	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Typ	Log	A/C	NO	Format No	Transaction	Pers	Tot. No	Cards					

NAVSAFECEN 3750.1/15 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 12 OF 13

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_ LOGGED: \_\_\_\_\_ PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

## COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES	CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 0		BODY POSITION	0 9 6 3	0 4				1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING GENERAL	1 0 4 6	0 5	
		0 9		SEAT POSITION/SEPAR TYPE SEPARATION	0 9 6 7	0 3				1 3		CONDITIONS AT SURVIVAL/ RESCUE SITE (TEMP WINDS)	1 0 5 1	0 7	
		1 2		Parachute Data Deploy/Open Shock/Oscillat	0 9 7 0	0 6				1 0		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (WAVES)	1 0 5 8	0 4	
		1 0		PARACHUTE DAMAGE	0 9 7 6	0 4				1 0		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (TERRAIN WEATHER)	1 0 6 2	0 4	
		1 0		PARACHUTE DAMAGE CAUSE	0 9 8 0	0 4				1 1		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO ALERT (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 6 6	0 5	
		0 7		DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING	0 9 8 4	0 1				1 0		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 1	1 0 7 1	0 4	
		1 1		LANDING CONDITIONS (WEIGHT WINDS)	0 9 8 5	0 5				1 0		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 2	1 0 7 5	0 4	
		0 9		DRAGGED BY CHUTE DISTANCE DRAGGED	0 9 9 0	0 3				1 1		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 7 9	0 5	
		1 0		LANDING POSITION	0 9 9 3	0 4				1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 0 8 4	0 4	
		0 9		DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING	0 9 9 7	0 3				1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 0 8 8	0 4	
		0 7		CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS	1 0 0 0	0 1				1 1		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 9 2	0 5	
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING SWIM	1 0 0 1	0 5	43664			1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 0 9 7	0 4	
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING DILBERT DUNK	1 0 0 6	0 5	43664			1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 1 0 1	0 4	
		1 1		PARACHUTE DRAG	1 0 1 1	0 5	43664			1 1		TIME LOCATE TO REACH (RESCUE VEHICLE)	1 1 0 5	0 5	
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED COCKPIT	1 0 1 6	0 5	43664			1 0		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 1 1 0	0 4	
89		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED SEAT	1 0 2 1	0 5	43664			1 0		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 1 1 4	0 4	
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN JUNGLE	1 0 2 6	0 5				1 1		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE/ABANDON	1 1 1 8	0 5	
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN ARCTIC	1 0 3 1	0 5				1 0		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE COMPLETE	1 1 2 3	0 4	
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN DESERT	1 0 3 6	0 5				1 0		TIME IN WATER	1 1 2 7	0 4	
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN MOUNTAIN	1 0 4 1	0 5				1 0		TIME IN RAFT	1 1 3 1	0 4	



# AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP NARRATIVE CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 3'

I.D. Number										3	A	06	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		12	13	18	19
Yr.		Mo.		Day		Log				Format No.	Trans Code	Tot. No. Cards	

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/19 (REV 2/69)

CARD 13 OF 13

CODED: 000 REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_

PUNCHED: \_\_\_\_\_ VERIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CARD NO.  
14 15 16

0 1

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

ACFT BINGOED TO BEACH + LAN ON FORMED RWY DUE TO H

0 2

UNG NLG. THE PLTS ERRED IN NOT ADHERING TO NATOPS

0 3

PROCEDURES WHEN LAN GEAR MAL EXIST. (b) (6)

0 4

(b) (6)

0 5

(b) (6)

0 6

(b) (6)

0 7

0 8

0 9

1 0

1 1

1 2

1 3

1 4

1 5

1 6

1 7

1 8

1 9

2 0

14 15 16

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER  
NAVAL AIR STATION  
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

112A/1g  
3750/2  
Ser 2033  
22 Sep 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center  
To: Commanding Officer, Fleet Tactical Support Squadron TWENTY-FOUR

Subj: VR-24 DET NAPLES AAR ser 1-69A concerning C-1A BuNo 146019  
accident occurring 22 March 1969, pilot (b)

1. The subject report and all endorsements have been reviewed. Concur with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause factors contributing to this accident have been recorded as follows:

a. OTHER PERSONNEL (carrier facility support personnel--safety petty officer--failed to ensure proper nose gear alignment on catapult).

\*b. PILOT--PLANE COMMANDER (judgment error--recommended landing gear be raised in violation of NATOPS when malfunction was indicated).

c. OTHER PERSONNEL:

(1) Field facility support personnel--crash crew--provided less than minimum of foamed area as required by NATOPS.

(2) Supervisory--base operations--failed to ensure that foam had been laid in accordance with NATOPS requirements.

\*Primary

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:  
NAVAIRSYS COMHQ (AIR 09E) (2)  
CINCUSNAVEUR  
COMSIXTHFLT  
COMNAVAIRLANT  
COMFAIRMED/COMASWFORSIXTHFLT  
CO USS SHANGRI LA (CVA-38)  
CO NAF NAPLES  
OINC VR-24 DET NAPLES  
NAVPRO BETHPAGE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER  
ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

- NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.  
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.  
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPARTMENT:

*Concur with conclusions and recommendations  
of accident board.*

*DSX 1233*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
INITIAL/CODE

LSD DEPARTMENT:

*Dr Ackow. Fatigue?? (CAN)*  
*No comment*

9.3 *No specific adverse comments.  
Physical training out of date as crew members, but  
not considered germane to accident phase. 82*

*No Comment MAP*

\_\_\_\_\_  
INITIAL/CODE



## COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:	Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1		/
DIR		/
Misc Items for Action or Correction		
To Code	From Code/Date	
	511 / 6-13-69	For telecon w/CHAF will send 1st, 2nd & 3rd Endorsements by Guardmail. PH
	/	/
	/	/
	/ 7/8/69	Hard-coded 6-18-69 bgn Actual Review Rdb
	/	/
	/	/
	511 / 7-10-69	ORIGINAL REC'D rdb
	/ 512	Rough close out letter submitted Rdb
	512 / 9/10/69	Location of mishaps to be chg to G5 CVA 38. ? see Rdb
	/	/
511	512D / 6-29-70	Final review completed all documents ready for the closed file. (b) (6)
	/	/
	/	/
	30 JUN 1970	

CLOSED

UNIT VRC-24  
 MODEL CIA  
 BUNO 146019

## AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

## ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING:
	M&M		9-9-69	0	
	LSD	7-25-61 SK	8-1-69	NWP	returned to Records 9-5-69 BB DO NOT ROUTE

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:  
 REMARKS:

## ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NAVSAFECEN  
 EXTENSIONS

18  
 12 SEP 1969

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AAD	9-5-69		19 Sep	Log	

## NAVSAFECEN ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	
1	R&DP				7/8 Initial Review R&DP
2	M&M				7/11 Rough close out ltr. submitted R&DP
3	ADMIN				14/20 Final close out ltr. reviewed R&DP

## ROUTING AFTER CLOSE-OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
LSD				

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.

2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.

3. Any department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

CNAL 002

Ser 4058

2 JUL 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VR-24 Det Naples accident serial 1-69A, concerning CIA,  
BuNo 146019 of 22 March 1969, pilot (b)

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet  
To: Commander Naval Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the  
Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

(b) (6)

Copy direction

Copy to:

COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E) ✓  
COMSIXTHFLT ✓  
CINCUSNAVEUR ✓  
COMFAIRMED ✓  
CO NAF NAPLES ✓  
CO USS SHANGRI-LA (CVA-38) ✓  
CO FLETACTSUPRON TWO FOUR  
OinC FLETACTSUPRON TWO FOUR DET  
COMASWFORSIXTHFLT ✓  
NAVPLANTREPO BETHPAGE ✓

SWT  
7-8-69



062  
N31:CRP:ks  
04/3750  
Ser: 522  
10 Jun 1969

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VR-24 DET Naples AAR 1-69A, CIA BUNO 146019 of  
22 Mar 1969, Pilot (b)

From: Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean/Commander, Antisubmarine  
Warfare Force, U.S. Sixth Fleet  
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center  
Via: Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: VR-24 DET Naples Aircraft Accident Report 1-69A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded with the following comments:

a. The Naval Air Facility, Naples crash crew erred in providing less than the minimum length of foamed area required per the CIA NATOPS Manual for an emergency involving a NOSE GEAR UP landing. By copy of this endorsement the Commanding Officer, Naval Air Facility, Naples is directed to initiate crash crew training to ensure compliance with the foam area requirements provided in the CIA NATOPS Manual in the event of a similar occurrence.

b. Consider that the Aircraft Accident Board erred in not obtaining a statement from the Topside Safety Petty Officer who actually checked the alignment of the nose wheel prior to launch as indicated in enclosure 5c, the statement of the catapult officer. This appears to be a very crucial point in the investigation. By copy of this endorsement the Commanding Officer of USS SHANGRI LA is requested to provide this statement direct to Commander, Naval Safety Center with copies to all concerned. )

(b) (6)

Copy to:  
NAVSAFCEC (2)  
NAVAIRSYSCOM (09E)  
COMSIXTHFLT  
CINCUSNAVEUR  
CO, VR-24  
COMNAVAIRLANT  
OINC, VR-24 DET NAPLES  
NAVPLANTREPO BETHPAGE  
CO, NAF NAPLES  
CO, USS SHANGRI LA (CVA 38)

By direction

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CVA38:RWG:clp

04/3750

Ser 956

24 MAY 1969

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VR-24 DET Naples AAR 1-69A concerning  
C-1A BUNO 146019

From: Commanding Officer, USS SHANGRI-LA (CVA-38)  
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center  
Via: (1) Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean/Commander,  
Antisubmarine Warfare Force, U.S. Sixth Fleet  
(2) Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: VR-24 DET Naples AAR 1-69A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded with the following comments:

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

The Catapult Officer stated that the launch sequence appeared normal in all respects, including the alignment of the nose wheel. In fact the alignment was checked twice - prior to the suspension and again after re-tensioning the aircraft. Regardless, had the pilot complied with standard NATOPS procedures and not recycled the landing gear when a problem was known to exist this accident would have been avoided. A cocked nose gear is a relatively common emergency in C1, E1, and S2 type aircraft whether operating from a carrier or an airfield, and in almost all cases when proper procedures are followed, very little, if any, damage occurs when landing with the nose gear cocked. The very basis for NATOPS is to provide the pilot with a set of standard procedures to follow when other than the norm occurs. When the pilot elects to violate NATOPS whether due to acting hastily, being apprehensive or because confusion exists as stated in Part VII, paragraphs 4 and 5, the possibility of an accident is materially enhanced.

*W. S. Nelson*  
W. S. NELSON

Copy to:  
NAVSAFCE (2)  
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR 09E)  
COMNAVAIRLANT  
COMSIXTHFLT  
COMFAIRMED  
CINCUSNAVEUR  
CO VR-24  
OINC VR-24 DET NAPLES  
NAVPLANTREPO BETHPAGE

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

A

**ORIGINAL**

NAF NAPLES:ASO:CHT:wb  
3750  
Ser 624  
13 May 1969

**THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VR-24 Det Naples AAR 1-69A, C-1A BUNO 146019 of  
22 Mar 1969, Pilot (b)**

From: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Facility, FPO New York 09520  
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Safety Center  
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, USS SHANGRI LA (CVA-38)  
(2) Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean/Commander, Antisubmarine  
Warfare Force, U. S. Sixth Fleet  
(3) Commander, Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: VR-24 Detachment Naples Aircraft Accident Report 1-69A

1. Forwarded with the following comments:

a. The plane commander's statement mentions that the foam was 1300 feet long and right of centerline. Careful reconstruction establishes the length of the foam pattern as 1870 feet, commencing 3000 feet from the approach end of runway 24 at a point 200 feet before the north taxiway entrance to the runway and ending at the E-5 arresting gear cross deck pendant location. The runway foaming was accomplished in two sweeps to increase thickness in the center and increase width. The first sweep was down the centerline while the second was made to the right of the first. It is agreed that white foam on a white concrete runway is very difficult to see at night. Accordingly, the crash crew has been instructed that in future emergencies requiring the use of foam, day or night, the foam will be centered on the center line of the runway.

b. OPNAV Form 3750-1, page 4, and Part V, as well as the pilot's statement, states that the wind was approximately 070 and constituted a downwind component to runway 24. Meteorological records during the period show the wind from the northeast, varying from calm to 6 knots. The local controller in the tower, in giving the pilot landing clearance, reported the wind as calm. Despite the possibility of a slight downwind component, runway 24 was recommended by Operations Department personnel since it has a 0.9 percent uphill gradient and an unrestricted approach path.

*R. M. Frye*  
R. M. FRYE

Copy to:  
OINC VR-24 DET  
CO VR-24  
CO USS SHANGRI-LA (CVA 38)  
COMFAIRMED  
COMNAVAIRLANT  
CINCUSNAVEUR

3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F



VR-24:09:car

3750

Ser: 228

28 APR 1969

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VR-24 DET Naples Aircraft Accident 1-69A C-1A BUNO  
146019 of 22 MAR 69 Pilot (b)

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Tactical Support Squadron TWENTY-FOUR  
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Safety Center  
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Facility Naples, Italy  
(2) Commanding Officer, USS SHANGRI-LA (CVA-38)  
(3) Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean/Commander, Antisubmarine  
Warfare Force, U. S. SIXTH Fleet  
(4) Commander, Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: VR-24 DET Naples Aircraft Accident Report 1-69A

1. Forwarded.
2. Concur with all recommendations except as noted in paragraph 3.
3. Recommendation #2 should include considerations of the single engine performance of a C-1A with a center of gravity sufficiently aft to keep the nose wheel off the deck. A more serious accident might result from this aft C. G. condition. This should also be considered in any handbook changes as suggested in recommendation #6 paragraph d.

  
W. J. SCOTT

Copy to:  
OINC VR-24 DET  
CO NAF NAPLES  
CO USS SHANGRI-LA (CVA 38)  
COMFAIRMED  
COMNAVAIRLANT  
CINCUSNAVEUR

ORIGINAL

VR-24 DET/LRB:chc  
3000  
Ser: 106  
16 April 1969

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VR-24 DET Naples Aircraft Accident 1-69A Pilot (b) (6)

From: Officer in Charge, Fleet Tactical Support Squadron TWENTY-FOUR  
Detachment  
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center  
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Fleet Tactical Support Squadron TWENTY-FOUR  
(2) Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Facility, Naples, Italy  
(3) Commanding Officer, USS SHANGRI-LA (OVA-38)  
(4) Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean/Commander, Antisubmarine  
Warfare Force, U. S. Sixth Fleet  
(5) Commander, Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: VR-24 DET Naples Aircraft Accident Report 1-69A

1. Forwarded.

2. It shall be the policy of this unit that during future carrier qualifications, a qualified Detachment representative will be assigned the deck crew, whose sole duty will be to ensure that the nose gear is properly aligned prior to catapult or deck launch. Additionally, during pre-CQ conferences with ships' representatives, correct nose gear checking procedures and the consequences of the gear not being aligned prior to launch will be particularly stressed.

  
L. R. BOLES

Advanced Copy to:  
CO, VR-24  
CO, NAF Naples  
CO, USS SHANGRI-LA (OVA-38)  
COMNAIRFED  
COMNAVAIRLANT

ORIGINAL

PART 1 GENERAL

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY OINC, VR-24 DET	2. SERIAL NO 1-69A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP 220103 MAR 69	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT C-7A	5. BUREAU NUMBER 746019
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	7. VIA: CO, VR-24	8. 11. TIME OF DAY Night	12. TIME IN FLIGHT 4.4	10. DAMAGE Substantial
9. LOCATION OF MISHAP NAF, Naples	13. FLIGHT CODE 3A4	14. CLEARED FROM CVA-38 TO: Naples	15. TYPE CLEARANCE I	16. AIRSPEED 160
17. A/C WEIGHT 18 050 24.4 <sup>2</sup> nac	18. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP S.L. 280 TERRAIN 0	19. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP Nose wheel up landing		
20. LIST MODEL, BUFG, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C) None				

FACTOR	FACTOR	FACTOR
1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT	9. SERVICING PERSONNEL	17. WEATHER
2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES	10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM	11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)	19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)	12. ADMINISTRATIVE	20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
5. CREW	13. FACILITIES: RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK	21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL	14. FACILITIES: NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (DCA, CCA, ILS, MIRCOR)	22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL	15. FACILITIES: CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)	23. UNDETERMINED
8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)	16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)	24. OTHER (Specify)

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) PILOT (at controls at time of mishap)	2. GRADE LT	3. THIS SERVICE NO (b) (6)	4. DESIG 1315	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE USNR	6. AGE 28	7. HEIGHT 5'4"	8. BULLET COMM AIO	9. POSITION Pilot	10. SIGNATURE G
CO-PILOT (Identify & submit separate)	CDR	(b) (6)	1310	USN	39	184	OINC	Copilot G	

11. ALL MODELS	2041	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL 151 / 30
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS	513	18. FOLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	IN MODEL 113 / 24
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS	84	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL 9 / 8
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C 1300	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	IN MODEL 9 / 8
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	OFT/CPT NA	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELIOS (if helo mishap)	ALL 27 / 4
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C 513	22. LAST FROM FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	IN MODEL 21 / 4
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK	6-6-68 QUAL	24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD	ALL 6 /
25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)		26. GRADE	DATE 27 March 1969
27. GRADE		28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	DURATION 2
29. THIS SERVICE NO		30. FILE/SERVICE NO	
31. AGE		32. HEIGHT	
33. BULLET		34. POSITION	

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F



AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with

Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750.1

PART I GENERAL

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY OINC, VR-24 DET	2. SERIAL NO 1-69A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP 220103 MAR 69	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT C-1A	5. BUREAU NUMBER 146019
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	9. LOCATION OF MISHAP NAF Naples	10. DAMAGE Substantial	11. TIME OF DAY Night	12. TIME IN FLIGHT 4.4
7. VIA	8. 11. TIME OF DAY Night	12. TIME IN FLIGHT 4.4	13. FLIGHT CODE 3A4	
	14. CLEARED FROM: CVA-38	15. TYPE CLEARANCE	16. AIRSPEED	17. A/C WEIGHT
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP	19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP S L	20. TERRAIN		
23. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)				

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
✓	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT	9	SERVICING PERSONNEL	17	WEATHER
✓	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES	10	LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	18	DESIGN AIRCRAFT
✓	3. PILOT INDIRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM	11	OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)	19	DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)	12	ADMINISTRATIVE	20	DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW	13	FACILITIES: RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK	21	ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL	14	FACILITIES: NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (CCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)	22	MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL	15	FACILITIES: CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)	23	UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)	16	FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)	24	OTHER (Specify)

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) PILOT (at controls at time of mishap)	2. GRADE/RATE	3. DESIGNS	4. DESIGNS	5. GRADE/RATE	6. AGE	7. YEARS OF SERVICE	8. ELEMENT	9. POSITION	10. DESIGNS
CD-PILOT (Identify & submit separate report)	CDR	(b) (6)	1310	USN	39	18 1/2	O IN C	CF	G

ITEM		ITEM	ALL	IN MODEL
11. ALL MODELS	4411	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	259	40
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS	129	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	70	1
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS	51	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	60	60
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C 1208	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	16	1
	OFF/CPT NA		16	1
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C 112	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)	16	1
	OFF/CPT NA		16	1
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C 51	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	21 March 1969
	OFF/CPT NA		DURATION	1
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK	10 March 1969 QUAL	24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD	Special	

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. GRADE/RATE	27. DESIGNS	28. DESIGNS	29. GRADE/RATE	30. AGE	31. YEARS OF SERVICE	32. ELEMENT	33. POSITION	34. DESIGNS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA									
1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST PAR/OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK	
DEC 31, 1957	7581.7	7	1	9.2	AERFER Naples	PAR	9.2	3	
ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR REQUESTED	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
1820-82	BL515 409	5248.6	5		560.0	NAVAIR WORKFAC JAX	PAR	9.2	3
1820-82	BL515 554	3312.6	3		708.7	"	"	9.2	3
C. COMPONENT HISTORY									
1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURER'S PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVH/ULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR REQUESTED	8. SER. NO. FOR AMPREP		
NA									
D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS									
1. PARTS REPAIRED			3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED		2. PARTS REPLACED				
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE				PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE			
NA									
JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)									
AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. VS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE		
	NA								
9. G FORCES	9. HEIGHT	10. ALTITUDE		11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL	14. NO. REJECT ATTEMPTS		
	<input type="checkbox"/> ATTEMPTED <input type="checkbox"/> ACCOMPLISHED					<input type="checkbox"/> PRIMARY <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL			
15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS								
RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE									
17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ALTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE		
NA									
25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS								
IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP									
1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER									
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE/TIME/GROUP									
3. OTHER Preliminary message report of aircraft accident DTG 221501Z MAR 69									
4. Supplementary message report of aircraft accident DTG 221501Z MAR 69									

Info NAC on DIR request. See para. 30 OPNAVINST 3770.62  
 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
 WITH OPNAVINST 3753.6F

# PLASTIC ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with

Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CATAPULT <input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTINGS 70#	3. WIND OVER DECK 28 kts	4. RELATIVE WIND 350 to 360°	5. APPROACH/END SPEED 67 kts
6. PLANE NUMBER C-11	7. MODEL NUMBER mod 1	8. LOCATION OF SHIP 5th cat FWD	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDGE NUMBER NAB5 Part #315158-1 Mark 2-mod2	

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOTICICES USED

A/C Launching Bulletin #15-45 of 15 July 1964

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS		15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
			CONSTANT PRESSURE DONE (P.S.I.)	RATIO		
DECK PENDANT	NA					
DECK PENDANT						
BARRIER/BARRICADE						

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS NA	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS
2. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS NA	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CLOUDS 8000	2. VISIBILITY 10 mi.	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY 180°R 6 MPH	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY: 40°F OUTSIDE AIR:	5. DEW POINT 36°F	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (clouds, fog, icing level, etc. state, density, altitude, as appropriate)					

MDT Icing in clouds 8000'

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
				200 NAVAVSAFECON DIRECT (A/C) 100 (BUWEP) DIRECT (A/C)
3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY				5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CC
COST DAMAGE TO: None				11 APR 1969
4. PRIVATE PROPERTY				

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

1. MEMBER (b) (6) CDR, USN	2. MEMBER (b) (6) LT	3. MEMBER (b) (6) CDR, MC	4. MEMBER (b) (6) LT
UNIT BULLET	UNIT BULLET	UNIT BULLET	UNIT BULLET

When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F



At approximately 1900Z, 21 March 1969, the pilots preflighted the aircraft and strapped in for a 1937Z launch for night carrier qualifications. The aircraft was catapulted and the aircraft commander completed two CCA's to arrested landings. While delayed on deck temporarily the pilots switched seats and CDR (b) was in position to commence his initial night qualifications in the C-1A.

A catapult shot and landing were completed in a normal manner. At approximately 2039Z the aircraft was again catapulted after a delay for a suspended catapult. All indications were that it was a normal catapult shot. After airborne the gear handle was raised at which time the pilot (left seat) noted, the nose gear indicated unsafe by the wheels position indicator and light in gear handle and lowered the handle. The gear then indicated down and locked. The copilot (right seat) noted the gear down and asked why they were down. He was told of the unsafe nose gear up indication. The copilot stated that the gear should be up. The gear was raised and again indicated unsafe nose gear. The gear was dropped and the nose gear indicated unsafe at this time. The CCA was completed to a low pass with a visual check by the LSO which showed the nose gear jammed in the wheel well. They were sent to the Delta pattern while the other aircraft completed their landings. The copilot (AC) then visually inspected the nose gear by removing the inspection covers in the cockpit deck. The gear was noted to be rotated approximately 120 degrees counter clockwise with the center of the port tire firmly planted against the hinge area of the starboard wheel well door. The nose gear scissors upper hinge was resting on top of structure adjacent to gladiator shield opening. The copilot used various parts of the aircraft to pry on the gear to try to release it. An attempt was made to dump the hydraulic pressure in an effort to ease the pressure against the gear. The stanchions of the cage were too large to get any leverage through the inspection holes and the emergency hydraulic pump handle was too short to pry with. No effort was made to cut a larger hole or different hole in the deck to permit use of the larger stanchions to pry with. At 2150Z the aircraft was diverted to NAF Naples, Italy, about 200 miles away. The aircraft proceeded main gear down and climbed to 8000 feet. Using maximum range power settings at altitude moderate icing conditions were encountered which dictated that they raise the gear to ensure enough fuel to reach their destination. The nose heater inlet had iced over which kept them from using the cockpit heater enroute. While inbound to Naples the pilots switched seats with the aircraft commander now in the pilot's seat. They then reviewed NATOPS procedures for a nose gear up landing among themselves and with another squadron aircraft that was proceeding along airways ahead of them. They requested that the runway be foamed starting 7000 feet from the approach end and 2000 feet long by 20 feet wide. NAF Naples Crash Crew foamed runway 24 approximately 1800 feet long and 20 feet wide commencing 3000 feet from the approach end and right of center line. The aircraft made a low pass to ensure the pilot was familiar with the location of the foam then proceeded down wind to set up for the final landing. The weather was given as approximately 3500 feet scattered 8000 feet overcast with 10 miles visibility, temperature 46 degrees F, dew pt. 36 degrees F.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH OMAVINST 375, 6F

The actual wind was 070/6 mph, giving a tailwind component. The airspeed indicator had been erratic at the ship and the pilot approached the runway at 90 knots indicated. On landing the pilot held the nose of the aircraft up and the copilot feathered both engines, secured the fuel/oil and hydraulic emergency switches, mixtures, ignition, raised flaps and positioned the props with the starter. The pilot noted that he had entered the foam and it appeared the aircraft would exit the foam prior to the nose falling so he lowered the nose into the foam. The aircraft exited the foam at the end in a slight left drift and continued for 200 feet. The pilots checked all switches secured and egressed through their overhead escape hatches. There was no fire and the emergency crash vehicles were on the scene immediately. —

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH O-KAVINST 375J.GF

PART VI

DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

VR 24 DET AAR 1-69A

1. All damage to the aircraft was sustained when the nose of the aircraft contacted the runway. The damages were confined to the nose wheel well and the lower forward fuselage in the area of the nose gear between FS 56.0 and FS 120.0.

2. Preliminary P and E Inspection conducted by Fleet Air Mediterranean Repair Activity provided the following:

- a. Aircraft considered repairable by FAMRA.
- b. Repairs will require an estimated 732 direct manhours during approximately 21 working days.
- c. Specific damages were:
  - (1) Skin, L/H (s) from FS 57.0 forward to nose landing trunion, loose rivets.
  - (2) Skin, R/H (FS) from FS 57.0 forward to nose landing trunion.
  - (3) Skin and underlying formers/longeron adjacent R/H nose wheel well from FS 74.0 to 114.0, scraped and buckled.
  - (4) Skin and underlying formers/longeron adjacent L/H nose wheel well from FS 74.0 to 114.0, scraped and buckled.
  - (5) Transverse beam, R/H nose wheel well (FS) 96.0 buckled at lower end.
  - (6) Frame, FS 120 at lower L/H aft wheel well, buckled and popped rivets.
  - (7) Floor beam, left and right webs and lower cap strips buckled and torn at FS 108.0.
  - (8) Nose landing gear strut subject to severe stress, scissors cracked necessitating replacement of nose landing assembly including drag brace.
  - (9) Fairing and link assembly of nose gear buckled and scraped.
  - (10) Door assembly, R/H nose wheel buckled and scraped.
  - (11) Door assembly L/H nose wheel buckled and scraped.
  - (12) Rod assemblies, left and right nose wheel doors broken.
  - (13) Duct assembly R/H nose wheel well badly dented.



1. Both Pilot and Copilot are experienced Naval Aviators. The Aircraft Commander has 1800 hours in C-1A/S2 aircraft in the last five (5) years and has been an Aircraft Commander in the C-1A for one (1) year and ten (10) months. The copilot has 4400 total flight hours of which 112 were in the C-1A during the past seven (7) months. He had accumulated nineteen (19) day and one (1) night landing during the past seven (7) months. He day carqualed five (5) months prior and was to be considered for Aircraft Commander after night carquals and route checks. His last NATOPS check had been flown only eleven (11) days before and is considered well qualified for a Second Pilot designation.

2. An analysis has determined three (3) possible ways which a C-1A may be launched from a carrier with an unsafe nose gear.

a. The shimmy damper roller may be rotated 30° or 180° from the aft center position and not be available to the shimmy damper yoke for its realigning functions; but at first glance, of either the 30° or 180° position, the nose wheel will appear to be aligned properly for a catapult launch. The limited visibility at night contributes greatly to oversights.

b. If the pilot should inadvertently lower the nose wheels toward the flight deck during the catapult runout and only one (1) wheel touches the flight deck resulting in an off center nose gear contact with the flight deck, the shimmy damper roller may be whipped out of shimmy damper yoke.

c. After an arrested landing, the roll back, braking and taxiing out of the arresting gear may cause the nose gear to oscillate in a manner so as to position the shimmy damper yoke out of sequence for recieving the shimmy damper roller. The roller will be outside and adjacent to the aligned yoke but during taxiing, heavy nose forces will allow the roller to force the yoke to onside thereby positioning the nose wheels fore and aft. When the nose forces decrease, the preload pressure of the shimmy damper will return the yoke to aft center forcing the roller and wheels to a side angle. At this angle one of the nose wheels will contact a nose well door when being raised. A keen flight deck observer is required to detect this discrepancy.

3. Since the flight deck handling out of the arresting gear resulted in forward motion at all times, the probability of the before mentioned 2(a) is remote. Statements by the Catapult Officer, enclosure (5c) and the Plane Commander, enclosure (4c), indicate that the catapult shot was experienced as normal, therefore the possibility of 2(b) was discarded. As a result of knowledge and experiences of pilots and maintainance personnel, item 2(c) was pursued.

4. After the catapult launch, the pilot had raised the gear handle and received an unsafe nose gear indication in both the gear position indicator and gear handle light. He then lowered the gear handle and the unsafe

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH R NAVINST 075.62

safe down and locked indication on all gear. The Copilot, who had been preoccupied with his duties of turning the anticollision lights on and reporting airborne to the GCA controller, had not observed the unsafe gear. At this time the pilot remarked to the copilot that they had had an unsafe nose gear; but the Copilot noticing that their gear was down, remarked that they should be up. The pilot interpreted this to mean raise the gear and did so. The nose gear hung in the up position. The pilots acted hastily and did not follow the prescribed NATOPS procedures for landing gear malfunction.

5. Although both pilots are experienced Naval aviators, the cockpit confusion may be attributed to (1) fatigue in that both pilots had had a 9½ hour duty day at the time the nose gear became hung up, although their flight time was 3.5 hours for CDR (b) and 2.5 hours for LT (b). (2) The overcast weather at the ship resulted in a very dark night with no horizon resulting in constant attention to the flight instruments leaving little effort to combat outside distractions without compromising basic airwork and flight safety. (3) The plane commander acting as copilot during initial night CARQUALS could be apprehensive and would tend to react a little hastily if he felt the pilot was slow to react.

6. As per LT (b) statement, enclosure (4a), the pilots entered the delta pattern and proceeded to troubleshoot the hung gear. The problem and procedures were discussed with shipboard personnel. It may be noted that LT (b) (6) procedure for bleeding the main system hydraulic pressure by using the emergency flap system was erroneous. The emergency gear and flap system are separate. The landing gear normal system pressure is bled by placing the landing gear selector handle up, place the emergency gear selector handle down, use hand pump until the emergency dump valve has popped and then cycle emergency gear selector handle until hydraulic pressure is dissipated.

7. With normal system pressure and the landing gear selector handle down, the selection and actuation of the emergency gear system would only be effective if a constant pressure exceeded the normal system pressure. Therefore, with normal system pressure it is unnecessary to use the emergency system.

8. This aircraft BUNO 146019 had Air Frames Change No. 482, pilot compartment deck removable access doors. Due to the position of the hung gear, the prescribed NATOPS procedures would not have freed it nor would the access doors have provided the required accessibility to dislodge the gear. No effort was made to cut additional access holes. Without results they binged to NAF Naples. Enroute to Naples further discussion of the problem was made with a second aircraft as per LTJG (b) (6) statement, enclosure (5a). The pilots elected to use a foamed runway and prepared accordingly. The approach and secure procedures were in accordance with the NATOPS pocket check list.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH OPNAVINST 3753.6F

9. Investigation revealed that paint was chipped off the outside of the shimmy damper yoke, enclosure (3g). It was established that the shimmy damper roller was the only part of the aircraft that could have come in contact with referenced paint. During an arrested landing, the nose wheel will be reversed on the roll back. If the nose wheels are then rotated about 45° followed by an immediate reversal, the shimmy damper roller may be placed out of sequence to the yoke, enclosure 8a and b, resulting in the roller being outside of the yoke when the nose wheels are aligned normally enclosure (8c). It is possible to taxi with the nose wheels in this position, but turning the air craft will cause a side skid on the nose tires. Inspection of involved tires revealed skid marks. Unless very carefully checked by the Catapult Topside Safety Observer, the nose gear would appear to be straight. When aircraft weight is off the nose gear, the yoke will center forcing the roller and nose gear out of alignment, positioning the wheels to contact the wheel well door upon retracting the gear.

10. Although the nose contacted the runway and relocated the position of the nose gear, a visual inspection afterwards of marred paint on the nose assembly confirm initial jammed position as noted by the aircraft commander. By drop-checking another C-1A the board was able to simulate the probable sequence which resulted in the jammed nose gear. By positioning the shimmy damper roller out of the yoke of the shimmy damper enclosure (8c) the starboard nose wheel tire will contact the starboard wheel-well door when raising the gear, rotating the nose wheels to a 90° relative position and resting against the inboard side of starboard door. In this position the outside of gladiator shield opening on portside and shimmy damper roller was against the outside of opening on starboard side. When the gear was lowered to the down and locked position the nose wheels remained 90° relative. When raising the gear the second time, the port wheel which is aft contacted the starboard door rotating the wheels and scissors permitting the top of scissors and shimmy damper roller to clear the sides of the gladiator shield openings and enter the wheel well. The shimmy damper roller was at a position such that the closing of the gladiator shield forced the rotation of the scissors and wheels clockwise positioning the port tire above the starboard door hinge and the top of the scissors against the inside of gladiator shield opening. The tire was compressed against the door hinge such that a sizeable force would have been required to dislodge the tire.

TOP OF THE SCISSORS  
WAS AGAINST THE

11. There were no material failures which contributed to the cause of the accident. The shimmy damper was checked at the local Fleet Air Mediterranean Repair Activity and revealed no malfunctions. There were no recent nose gear malfunctions and no unincorporated nose wheel/nose well service change.

1. damaged parts are being retained by VR-24 DET.

12. Unsafe landing gear was not one of the emergencies covered during pre CARQUAL briefs. At the request of VR-24 DET the Catapult Officer had assumed the responsibility of providing and briefing flight deck aircraft checkers. Squadron personnel were not utilized as checkers due to lack of current flight deck experience.

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WITH O'NANIST 3751.6F



PART VIII CONCLUSIONS VR-24 DET AAR 1-69A

1. The factors contributing to a nose gear up landing were:
  - a. The aircraft was catapulted with the shimmy damper roller probably out and adjacent to the shimmy damper yoke.
  - b. The pilots erred in not adhering to the CLL NATOPS procedures when a landing gear malfunction exists. After receiving an unsafe nose gear indication, the pilot lowered the gear to a down and locked indication then recycled the gear to a hung position.
  - c. The Plane Commander, acting as copilot, erred in the proper supervision of the pilots activities. He also erred in the procedures for troubleshooting a hung nose gear in that he attempted to bleed the normal system hydraulic pressure by actuating the emergency flap system, although the proper procedures would probably have not aided in dislodging the nose gear.

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WITH OPMVINST 375J.6F

PART IX RECOMMENDED ACTION VR-24 DET AAR 1-69A

1. The present cockpit deck inspection ports lead the pilots to believe that all nose gear malfunctions can be corrected through these ports if the discrepancy is correctable. Being doubtful of airframe construction, fluid lines and wiring below the cockpit deck, the pilots may not pursue another course of action if their attempt through these ports fails. Since the present inspection ports do not provide the best relative position for leverage when attempting to dislodge hung nose wheels, the Board recommends an airframe change providing an additional pair of inspection plates in the cockpit deck abeam each seat. This area is directly above the raised nose wheels and would provide direct leverage for manipulating the gear. VR-24 DET Safety UR NO. 0007 of 11 April 69 has been submitted recommending that the cockpit deck area be marked with paint as an interim measure. Appropriate NATOPS change would be required.

2. During most unsafe nose gear landings the cabin may have sufficient cargo or passengers aft to prevent the nose from falling through on the roll-out. The Board recommends that the shifting of weight aft for landing should always be the primary technique with unsafe nose gear; therefore, an evaluation should be made to determine the amount of weight to be placed aft in the cabin which would be safe for flight and would prevent the nose from falling through during the roll-out. As a result of this published evaluation in the NATOPS, plane commanders could readily determine when they have sufficient weight in the cabin to be placed aft. Secondly, it may be practical for commands, during FLEP's and CARQUALS to have dummy weights in the cabin which can be shifted aft when needed. This would be useful during those periods when there are only two pilots and a cabin with seats only.

3. In the event it should become necessary to land on a foamed runway, the pilot would be attempting a maneuver with many variables not previously experienced. The Board recommends that an evaluation be made and that a graph be included in NATOPS to reflect the ground roll before the nose falls through. This graph should take into consideration winds, props feathered, raising flaps after touchdown, total weight, and not using brakes. It may be pointed out that the plane commander entered the foamed area faster than anticipated and had to prematurely lower the nose. The fast speed is attributed to the relative winds, raised flaps, and feathered props.

4. The Board recommends that luminous paint marking be applied to sides of the fixed and swivel portions of the nose gear so as to reflect proper alignment.

5. The Board recommends that all squadrons operating aboard ship should keep the appropriate carrier personnel informed of particular aircraft problem area. For CIA squadrons there should be a qualified squadron aircraft checker at the catapult during CARQUALS.

6. The Board recommends the following changes to the NATOPS Flight Manual and the Pilots Pocket Check List:

a. That all landing gear malfunctions and problems be grouped in one section. Presently they are separated by several pages.

b. Incorporate the statement, "nose gear malfunctions are most prevalent during normal touch and go landings, FOLP and carrier operations and a cocked nose gear should be suspected when unsafe gear indications exist."

c. All references to securing the engines during emergency landings should state that the mixtures are secured after feathering and prior to attempting to position the prop blades. The reason is that the fuel will sometimes allow the engines to continue running slowly and any attempts to position the props during this time would be futile.

d. The Nose Gear Up Landing and the Cocked Nose Wheel Landing procedures are basically the same except:

1. During the nose gear up landing the cabin weight is not shifted aft prior to landing and the flaps are raised after landing. During the nose wheel cocked landing the cabin weight is shifted aft prior to landing and the flaps are not raised. Some standardization should be considered.

7. The proposed changes to the NATOPS Manual are being submitted in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.0 series.

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WITH OPNAVINST 375.6F



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WITH O-NAVINST 3750.6F

**AIRCRAFT FIRE/RESCUE REPORT**  
NAVAIR FORM 11135/1 (8-67) (SHEET 1 OF 2)

NO TRANSMITTAL LETTER REQUIRED

REPORT SYMBOL NAVAIR 11135-1

STATION AND LOCATION

USMAP NAPLES, ITALY  
FPO NEW YORK 09520

REPORTING CUSTODIAN

ELEACTIONS/PROBATION TWENTY FOUR DET.

DATE OF REPORT

24 March 1969

AFR NO.

4-69

DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT

22 March 1969 0023

ON STATION

X

OFF STATION

MODEL AIRCRAFT INVOLVED

C-1A

BUREAU NO.

146019

TO: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

EXACT LOCATION OF INCIDENT  
3400 ft from approach  
end of runway 24

5200 ft\*

MILITARY COMMAND

VIA

CHIEF/PROBATION/COMNAVFORSEVENTH

SIGNATURE

TYPE OF INCIDENT

FIRE INVOLVED

ESTIMATED CASE

TAKE-OFF	LINE OR LOADING	FUELING	YES
LANDING	PARKED	MAINTENANCE	NO
TAXIING	DEFUELING	INFLIGHT	IMPACT
OTHER (Specify)			IGNITION

Hose wheel would not extend

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF INCIDENT

GENERAL WEATHER PICTURE

Cloudy  
10 miles visibility

WIND DIRECTION

North

WIND VELOCITY (mph)

3-5 knots

TEMPERATURE (°F)

50

NATURE OF TERRAIN AT AND IN APPROACH TO INCIDENT

Mountain

LIQUID FUEL QUANTITY

ESTIMATED ON BOARD BEFORE INCIDENT (lbs) 1800 lbs

ESTIMATED ON BOARD AFTER INCIDENT (lbs) 900 lbs

ESTIMATED SPILL AREA (Size in feet) None

OTHER FUELS

None

PERSONNEL RESCUE

NO. PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT	2
NO. PERSONNEL SURVIVED	2
NO. PERSONNEL ESCAPED UNAIDED	2
NO. PERSONNEL RESCUED	0

DESCRIBE RESCUE METHODS USED

None

FIRE FIGHTING

FIRST METHOD OF ALARM USED

TIME RECORD

TWO-WAY RADIO

EMERGENCY INTER-COM

EMERGENCY PHONE

TIME ALARM RECEIVED

OTHER METHOD (State)

Office telephone

TIME EQUIPMENT ARRIVED

STATION EQUIPMENT

EACH EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AT INCIDENT		NO. PERSONNEL MANNING EQUIPMENT		QUANTITY EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED	
TYPE	NO. LOADS USED	MIL	CIV	FOAM (gals. conc. used)	OTHER TYPES AND QUANTITIES
MB-5	0	3	0	0	None
MB-5	0	0	4	0	None
MB-1	1 1/3	0	7	70	None
Pick-up	0	1	1	0	None
Ambulance	0	1	0	NA	NA

STATION EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE

TYPE	DEFICIENCY	NO. OF DAYS	EXPLAIN DELAYS TO REPAIR
Pumper 500 GPM	Main pump	44	Awaiting parts
"	Clutch	1	Awaiting repairs
MB-5	Engine change	191	Awaiting installation

0102-614-0100

ENCLOSURE (1)

DESCRIPTION OF DIFFICULTIES IN FIRE CONTROL AND EXTINGUISHMENT  
DUE TO UNUSUAL CONDITIONS OR EQUIPMENT AND/OR AGENT INADEQUACIES

None

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EQUIPMENT  
AND/OR PROCEDURES TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY


None

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WITH C. NAVINST 375.62

DAMAGE (Classified as defined in OPNAVINST 3750.6E, Paragraph 10, Pages 3, 4, & 5)			
CLASSIFICATION	PERCENT DAMAGE BY IMPACT	PERCENT DAMAGE BY FIRE	LOSS TO SURROUNDING PROPERTY
ECHO	100%	None	None
Attach supplemental page providing full description of fire fighting, rescue or salvage operations, including: (1) Diagram of incident showing wind direction, approach of equipment, position of aircraft, distances, etc.; (2) Reduction of fire damage to the aircraft occasioned by prompt and efficient fire fighting operations.			
DATE	PREPARED BY (Name and title)	SIGNATURE	
24 Mar 1969	(b) (6) Fire Chief		
DATE		SIGNATURE	

ENCLOSURE (1)  
Pg 2





The Crash Crew was notified at 2330 by telephone from the Flight Clearance Desk that a C-1A with a locked nose wheel that could not be extended would arrive at HAF Haplon in approximately 2 hours. The crash trucks arrived on the runway at 0040 and permission to foam the runway was granted at 0045. The foaming was completed at 0055. The distance foamed was approximately 1800' long and 30' wide. The aircraft landed at 0113 abeam of the GCA unit and stayed in the foam blanket for about 3/4 of the distance and then veered to the left side of the runway.

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH O TAVINST 375 6F**

ENCLOSURE (1)

Pg 3



ENCLOSURE 2A




ENCLOSURE 26







TIRE PRESSURE




ENCLOSURE 5A





30












ENCLOSURE 3F





24 March 1969  
Monday

Statement of LT (b) (6)

USNR, (b) (6)

On the evening of 21 March 1969 I was acting as co-pilot of Navy C-1A 146019 in the CQ Pattern at the USS SHADOWN GA. CDR (b) (6) USN, Officer in Charge, VR-24 Detachment was sitting the aircraft from the left seat. On our second catapult shot, which began with a suspend, and ended with (b) (5) shot, gear retraction was initiated and it was noted that the nose gear indicated unsafe. The gear handle was placed down and a positive down indication was obtained on all three gear. Again the gear were retracted with the nose gear indicating unsafe. Tower and paddles were notified and the gear lowered in order to complete the CCA to a low pass. An Aldis lamp inspection by the LGO (LCDR (b) (6)) confirmed the gear was stuck in the wheel well.

A starboard holding pattern was set up and I proceeded to investigate the nose gear through the inspection plates in the deck of the aircraft. The gear was rotated about 120 degrees counter-clockwise, placing the center of the port tire firmly against the hinge area of the starboard nose gear door. The upper scissors hinge was resting on top of the skin of the aircraft (inside). Various methods were used to try to dislodge the gear. Pump handle, cargo compartment stanchion (large and small), and cargo compartment cross members. All were either too short or too fat. The system hydraulic pressure was relieved by popping the dump valve and relieving handpump pressure with the flaps. Again attempts were made to dislodge the gear.

At 2150Z (about one hour after first unsafe indication) I diverted to NAF Naples at FL80 under control of Rome ATC using maximum range power. At this point, I was asked by the O in C if I wanted to fly the aircraft since I was the Aircraft Commander. I said yes. The gear had been left down on the recommendation of the ship but moderate icing was encountered and the gear was raised in order to maintain altitude and airspeed. The icing and low GAT dictated the use of the nose heater even in view of fuel consumption. However, the nose heater flapper valve had iced up rendering the heater inoperative. It remained quite cold in the cockpit.

Prior to arrival at Naples, foam was requested in accordance with NATOPS (2000 feet long, 20 feet wide, beginning 2000-3000 feet from approach end) I requested 3000 feet from approach end. Two passes were made to orient myself with the actual location of the foam. It was on the right side of runway 24 and seemed to be shorter than 2000 feet long. Most all communications concerning the foaming of the runway were done on Base Ops frequency.

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WITH OPNAVINST 375J.6F

Enclosure (4A)

I might interject here that during the CQ period, the airspeed indicators had been reading high by about 10 kts. I came across the fence at 90 kts indicated (assuming it would be about 80 kts calibrated). The winds were broadcast as calm but were actually on my tail at about 5 kts. At touchdown, the co-pilot feathered both props and continued the check list exactly. After entering the foam, I saw that I was still quite fast, and that I would be out of the foam long before the nose would come down. I decided to lower the nose into the foam rather than wait. The aircraft exited the foam at the end and left side, about 5-10 degrees off runway heading. As the engines were not turning, I had no rudder assist or power brakes to aid in turning to the right. Maximum pressure was exerted on the starboard brake with no effect. The aircraft came to a stop about 20-30 feet from the edge of the runway. The co-pilot and I exited through the overhead hatches and waited the arrival of the crash crew.

(b) (5)



(b) (5)



LT

USNR

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WITH O7NAVINST 375J.6F

Enclosure (4A)

STATEMENT OF CDR. (b) (6) USN CO-PILOT  
BUNO 146019 ON 21 MARCH 1969 ACCIDENT

At 1937Z LT (b) (6) and myself were launched from the USS SHANGRI LA in 019 a CIA Aircraft BUNO 146019 for night carrier landings. After LT (b) (6) had made 2 night landings we switched seats and I made one night landing. There was one suspend on the catapult before we were launched. After a normal catapult shot I moved the gear handle to "ur" and started climbing to 1200 ft. During the climb it was noticed that the nose gear indicated unsafe and the red warning light in the gear handle was on. Gear "down" was then selected and all gear indicated down and locked. It was noted by both LT (b) (6) and myself that the nose gear went down and locked almost immediately after selection. LT (b) (6) suggested we raise the gear again, which I did, and again got an unsafe nose gear indication. After this cycling of the nose gear became jammed and would not move. LT (b) (6) got out of the co-pilot seat and removed the inspection plates from the deck and with the aid of a flashlight visually inspected the nose gear. He made repeated efforts to free the nose gear and all attempts were futile. The decision was made to "bingo" to Naples for landing. During the flight a climb to 8000 ft. was made and LT (b) (6) took over the pilots seat and control of the aircraft. Icing was encountered and the gear was raised to maintain altitude and assure enough fuel to reach Naples. Upon arrival at Naples there was about 15 minutes delay waiting for the runway to be foamed. Emergency procedures were reviewed during this time. As LT (b) (6) flared for the landing I feathered the starboard engine, then the port engine, raised the flaps, pulled both mixtures to idle cut-off, pulled the master ignition to off, and closed emergency fuel/oil and hydraulic switches. At this time we were on the deck and were rolling through the foam. LT (b) (6) said he was going to let the nose down in the foam and as I checked the props, the starboard one had one blade sticking straight down, I quickly hit the starter and moved it, just before the nose started down. The nose touched down easily and stayed on the deck. The aircraft slid to a stop, all switches were checked to be sure they were off and we climbed out the overhead hatches.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (1/3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH OCMNAVINST 375.6F



24 March 1969  
Monday

Statement of LTJG (b) (6) USNR, concerning Aircraft Accident of  
22 March 1969 A/C BuNo 146019

On the evening of 21 March 1969, I was flying in the co-pilot seat of A/C 146034 during the night carrier refresher under control of the USS SHANGRI-LA. On our downwind leg after our third arrested landing I heard A/C 146019 report that his nose gear indicated unsafe up; he was then switched to another frequency.

Upon completion of our fourth night trap, we were held on deck and loaded for our return flight to Naples. After departure from the ship we requested to be switched to the same frequency as 146019. We contacted 146019 on VHF COMMON 123.45 and performed radio relay communications between Rome Control and 146019. During the flight to Naples I discussed with the pilots of 146019 the proper foaming procedures and also the proper procedures to be performed on touch down.

After discussing the foaming procedures we agreed that the foam would be layed 3000 feet from the approach end, and that it should be 2000 feet long and 20 feet wide.

Approaching Sorrento VOR we were cleared to Naples Approach frequency and 146019 was cleared also. We were cleared to GCA frequency and 146019 remained in contact with Naples Approach.

After breaking out of cloud deck, we requested to cancel our instrument flight plan and to proceed VFR-VMC to the airfield. We landed on runway 06 at 2335z one half hour prior to 146019 and taxied to the VR-24 ramp.

I watched 146019 land on runway 24, nose over and skid out of the foam and come to rest abeam the NAF Wardroom.

My Aeronautical Experience consists of 1300 flight hours accumulated in three years of flying, one year of which was spent in the Training Command. I am currently a qualified C-1A Plane Commander.

This is a true and correct statement.

(b) (6)

LTJG

USNR /

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH COMNAVINST 375.0F

Enclosure (5A)



STATEMENT OF LCDR (b) (6) USN, CONCERNING C-1A BUONO 146019  
ACCIDENT OCCURRING 22 MARCH 1969.

I was in Pri-fly of the USS SHANGRI-LA when the pilot of 146019 originally declared that he could not extend his nose gear, this being approximately 2130A on 21 March 1969.

During this time many conversations between the ship and 019 took place; with the pilot of 019 stating several times that after the initial unsafe nose gear position after first raising his wheels after catapult launch, he had lowered the wheels and received a safe down indication on all three wheels, but on attempting further to raise the landing gear, the nose gear still indicated unsafe and that now he could not lower the nose gear even though several cycles of the landing gear was made.

While discussion was being held between the ship and the aircraft, one of the other Detachment C-1A's completed its night refresher landings and began to load up to return to Naples. Since I was scheduled to return to Naples that night, I boarded this aircraft, departing shortly thereafter, arriving in Naples approximately 0020A, 22 March 1969. During the flight to Naples, I was informed that 019 had departed the vicinity of the ship and was proceeding to Naples with its nose gear still not being able to be lowered.

Upon arrival at Naples, I was informed that 019 was still some 20 or 30 minutes out of Naples. I stowed my flight gear in my locker and proceeded out of the VM-24 Detachment hanger to await arrival of 019. Outside, I was told that some help might be needed at MAF Operations Office, where they were in radio contact with 019. Arriving at Operations, I saw that LT (b) (6) Detachment Maintenance Officer, was talking on the radio with LT (b) (6) the pilot of 019. They discussed various procedures, with LT (b) (6) finally stating that he had done all that was possible to unjam the nose gear and that he was bringing the aircraft in for a landing. With this, I left operations and headed toward the runway some 200 yards away. On the way to the runway I saw 019 make a low pass at about 500 feet altitude then turn downwind to land on runway 24. As I passed the aircraft parking area in front of operations, I saw 019 on final to runway 24. I stopped to watch the landing. At initial touchdown far down the runway to my right, I could only see the lights of the aircraft. As the aircraft proceeded on its landing roll and became more visible, I saw that the nose of the aircraft was already on the runway. The aircraft continued for some two thousand more feet sliding on its nose, emitting a few sparks from the nose area. When the aircraft stopped sliding on the runway, I hurried to the plane still some 100 yards off in front of me. By the time I reached the aircraft, the crash crew, ambulance and other people were at the scene and the pilots were out of the aircraft; the time being approximately 0100A 22 March 1969.

My aeronautical experience consists of 4700 hours during 20 years as naval aviator and I am now currently Plane Commander qualified in the C1A aircraft.

(b) (6)

At 2039 GMT, I launched C1A 146019 from the USS Shangri-La's (CVA-38) starboard catapult. Zero one nine's catapult shot was preceded by a suspension for electrical difficulties with the catapult's stand-by circuit. Visual characteristics of the launch sequence appeared normal in all respects, including the alignment of the nose wheel. This alignment was checked by my Topside Safety Petty Officer.

(b) (6)

LCDR, USN

ITEMS 1-10

1. Catapult
2. 70 pounds steam
3. 28 knots
4. 350 degrees to 360 degrees
5. 67 knots
6. C-11
7. MOD I
8. 37 degrees 23.8'N  
17 degrees 28.0'E
9. Bridle: NAEC Part #315158-1  
Arrester: VAN ZELM Mark 2 MOD 2
10. Aircraft Launching Bulletin Number 15-45 of 15 July 1966

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH (U MAG) 11 275-60

ENCLOSURE 6C1

8 April 1969

To : Aviation Safety Officer, VR-24  
From: GCA/Tower Controllers, GCA Unit #23

Subj: Incident Involving Aircraft 46019 on 21 March 1969

At approximately 2200Z 21 March 1969, GCA was advised of CIA #46019 inbound to this station from CVA-38 with retracted nose gear. At 2300Z the Tower was manned. Shortly thereafter the pilot of 46019 gave an Approach Control estimate of 2330Z at Sorrento. 46019 was advised to hold over the Naples Beacon until two preceding aircraft could be landed and foaming of the runway could be accomplished. Normal crash precautions were followed and at 0003Z 22 March, 46019 landed, runway 24, with nose gear retracted. Touchdown appeared to be about 1000 feet from the approach end of the runway. Upon passing the GCA Unit (approximately 3500 feet from the approach end of the runway), it appeared the props were windmilling slowly and without engine noise. The foam area started at this point and after traversing approximately 1000 feet of the foam area, the aircraft nose dropped and shortly thereafter the aircraft came to a halt. Fire equipment (both USN and Italian) converged at the scene and shortly thereafter, the aircraft was towed from the area. The runway was cleared of all equipment, personnel, etc. and the runway "swept" by the crash crew. The runway was reported by the crash crew to be safe for use at 0115Z.

Very Respectfully;

(b) (6)

AC1

Section Leader

(b) (6)

Tower Operator

(b) (6)

Duty Controller

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH O NAVINST 3751.6F

ENCLOSURE (5D)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT  
IDENTIFICATION, FLIGHT AND NARRATIVE DATA  
OPNAV FORM 3750/8A (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8101

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7

See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)

I. IDENTIFICATION

Officer in Charge, VR-24 DET, FPO, New York 09520		2. MOR NUMBER 2-69	3. DAMAGE CODE SUBSTANTIAL
4. TYPE OF MISHAP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> GROUND ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT	5. NO. OF OCCUPANTS TWO	6. DATE 22 MAR 69	7. MODEL A/C C1A
9. MODEL OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED NA	10. BUND NA	11. NO. OF OCCUPANTS NA	8. BUND 146019
12. DAMAGE CODE NA			

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED (Use Additional Sheets if Required) NAME (Last, First and Middle Initial)		14. RANK/RATE	15. BRANCH OF SERVICE	16. DUTY BILLET	17. INJURY CODE	18. DISPOSITION
A. (b) (6)		LT	USN	PILOT	G	NA
B. (b) (6)		CDR	USN	PILOT	G	NA
C.						
D.						

II. FLIGHT DATA (At Time of Emergency)

1. TERRAIN CLEARANCE 0 FEET	2. FIELD ELEV. 286 FEET	3. TIME AT CARBON ALTITUDE 4 HOURS 24 MIN.	4. AMBIENT ALTITUDE 0-8000 FEET	5. TIME AT AMBIENT ALTITUDE 4 HOURS 24 MIN.
6. PLACE IN FORMATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A - SINGLE AIRCRAFT <input type="checkbox"/> L - LEAD <input type="checkbox"/> W - WING Y - OTHER (SPECIFY) _____		8. HORIZON <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 - DISTINCT <input type="checkbox"/> 2 - OBSCURED B - OTHER (SPECIFY) _____		
7. CLOUD CONDITIONS <input type="checkbox"/> 0 - CLEAR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 - OVERCAST <input type="checkbox"/> 2 - UNDERCAST 3 - IN CLOUDS 4 - IN AND OUT OF CLOUDS B - OTHER (SPECIFY) _____		9. DURATION OF FLIGHT HOURS 04 MIN 24		

III. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Continue on Reverse Side if necessary)

1937Z-2039Z- CARQUAL PATTERN ALTITUDE 60-1200 FEET. COMPLETED THREE CCA'S TO LANDING.  
2039Z- AGAIN CATAPULTED- GEAR PROBLEM-CLIMBED TO 2500 FEET  
2150Z- DEPARTED FOR NAPLES - FLIGHT LEVEL 8000 FEET  
2343Z- ARRIVED AT NAPLES - DESCENDED TO 1000 FEET  
0003Z- LANDED AT NAPLES

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

ENCLOSURE (7)

891



TO BE USED ONLY ON INDIVIDUALS MEETING CRITERIA PRINTED ON REVERSE SIDE

I. BACKGROUND (Complete for all pilots and co-pilots) (A thru C not applicable)

D. DATE OF LAST PREVIOUS FLIGHT **21 MARCH 1969**

E. IN LAST 24 HOURS **6** MIN. **25** F. IN LAST 48 HOURS **8** MIN. **50** G. IN LAST 24 HOURS **6** MIN. **25** H. IN LAST 48 HOURS **8** MIN. **50**

I. IN LAST 24 HOURS **17** MIN. **3** J. IN LAST 48 HOURS **25** MIN. **3** K. IN LAST 24 HOURS **6** MIN. **0** L. IN LAST 48 HOURS **15** MIN. **0**

M. CONTINUOUS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP HOURS **17** MIN. **3** N. HOURS CONTINUOUSLY AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP **18**

O. DURATION OF LAST SLEEP PERIOD HOURS **9** MIN. **0** P. TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO FLIGHT HOURS **15** MIN.

II. ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA

A. DATE OF BIRTH DAY **(b) (6)** B. HEIGHT **(b) (6)** INCHES C. WEIGHT **(b) (6)** POUNDS

D. SITTING HEIGHT **NA** INCHES E. TRUNK HEIGHT **NA** INCHES F. FUNCTIONAL REACH **NA** INCHES

G. BUTTICK-KNEE LENGTH **NA** INCHES H. LEG LENGTH **NA** INCHES I. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID) **NA** INCHES

III. LOCATION IN A/C **PILOTS SEAT**

IV. TRAINING (Complete for all personnel in flying status)

TYPE TRAINING	PLACE ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED	
		MONTH	YEAR

A. PHYSIOLOGICAL LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER AND VERTICAL TRAINING

LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER	NAS PENSACOLA	JULY	1964
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B. EJECTION SEAT/PARACHUTE TRAINING

LECTURES/DEMONSTRATIONS	NAS PENSACOLA	JULY	1964
TRAINING FILMS	NAS PENSACOLA	JULY	1964
UNARMED EJECTION SEAT	NA		
ARMED EJECTION SEAT	NA		
JUMP SCHOOL	NA		
PARASAIL TRAINING	NA		
OTHER (Specify)	NA		

C. SURVIVAL TRAINING

WATER SURVIVAL	NAS PENSACOLA	JULY	1964
MAINTENANCE SWIM	NAS PENSACOLA	JULY	1964
DILBERT DRINKER	NAS PENSACOLA	JULY	1964
PARACHUTE DRAG	NAS PENSACOLA	JULY	1964
IMMERSED COCKPIT/SEAT	NAS PENSACOLA	JULY	1964
JUNGLE SURVIVAL	NA		
ARCTIC SURVIVAL	NA		
DESERT SURVIVAL	NA		
MOUNTAIN SURVIVAL	NA		
SURVIVAL (General)	NA		

V. LIST OF ALL PERSONAL CLOTHING AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT WORN AND CARRIED

GREEN FLIGHT SUIT

HARD HAT

BOOTS- STEEL TOE

FLIGHT JACKET

LIFE VEST- REMOVED PRIOR TO LANDING

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

NAME **(b) (6)** A/C **CL1** BUINO **146019**

ENCLOSURE (7)

82

## INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING USE OF ABBREVIATED MOR

AN ABBREVIATED MOR (OPNAV FORM 3750/BJ) MAY BE SUBMITTED ON AN INDIVIDUAL WHEN ALL OF THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA ARE MET:

1. NO INJURY.
2. NO CAUSAL OR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR ATTRIBUTED TO THIS INDIVIDUAL.
3. NO PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL OR ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS, AS LISTED ON OPNAV FORM 3750/BC OF THE STANDARD MOR. (ALL SECTIONS APPLY.)
4. NO PERSONAL/SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT USAGE OR ATTEMPTED USAGE (OTHER THAN WEARING OF CLOTHING).
5. NO LACK OF REQUIRED PERSONAL EQUIPMENT OR CLOTHING.
6. NO PERSONAL EQUIPMENT OR CLOTHING PROBLEMS, DAMAGE OR FAILURE, AS LISTED ON OPNAV FORM 3750/BE (PAGE 2) OF THE STANDARD MOR.
7. NO EMERGENCY ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE, OTHER THAN STANDARD POST-FLIGHT EGRESS BY WAY OF NORMAL EXIT MEANS. EMERGENCY HATCH USED ONLY TO EXPEDITE EGRESS IS NOT AN EMERGENCY EGRESS.
8. NO EGRESS HAZARDS SUCH AS FIRE, GEAR BREAKING, LOSS OF AIRCRAFT, ABNORMAL AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE, ETC.
9. NO EGRESS DIFFICULTIES AS LISTED ON OPNAV FORM 3750/BI (PAGES 2 AND 3) OF THE STANDARD MOR.
10. NO SURVIVAL EPISODE.
11. NO RESCUE EPISODE.

## COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF SECTIONS I THROUGH V ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS PAGE ARE CONTAINED IN THE CURRENT EDITION OF OPNAVINST 3750.6

FLIGHT SURGEON'S NAME AND GRADE

(b) (6)

CDR MC USN

DUTY STATION

NAF NAPLES

SIGNATURE

(b) (6)

TO BE USED ONLY ON INDIVIDUALS MEETING CRITERIA PRINTED ON REVERSE SIDE

I. BACKGROUND (Complete for all pilots and co-pilots) (A thru C not applicable)

D. DATE OF LAST PREVIOUS FLIGHT **21 MARCH 1969**

E. IN LAST 24 HOURS **4** HOURS AND MINUTES FLOWN **20** MIN. F. IN LAST 48 HOURS **6** MIN. **45** G. IN LAST 24 HOURS **4** MIN. **20** H. IN LAST 48 HOURS **6** MIN. **45**

I. IN LAST 24 HOURS **6** HOURS AND MINUTES WORKED **45** MIN. J. IN LAST 48 HOURS **8** MIN. **45** K. IN LAST 24 HOURS **8** HOURS SLEPT **16** MIN.

M. CONTINUOUS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP HOURS **17** MIN. N. HOURS CONTINUOUSLY AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP **18**

O. DURATION OF LAST SLEEP PERIOD HOURS **8** MIN. P. TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO FLIGHT HOURS **30** MIN.

II. ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA

A. DATE OF BIRTH DAY **(b) (6)** B. HEIGHT **(b)** INCHES C. WEIGHT **(b)** POUNDS

D. SITTING HEIGHT **NA** INCHES E. TRUNK HEIGHT **NA** INCHES F. FUNCTIONAL REACH **NA** INCHES

G. BUTTOCK-KNEE LENGTH **NA** INCHES H. LEG LENGTH **NA** INCHES I. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID) **NA** INCHES

III. LOCATION IN A/C **CO-PILOTS SEAT**

IV. TRAINING (Complete for all personnel in flying status)

TYPE TRAINING	PLACE ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED	
		MONTH	YEAR
LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER	CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA	MARCH	1966

A. PHYSIOLOGICAL, LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER AND VERTICAL TRAINING

TYPE TRAINING PLACE ACCOMPLISHED COMPLETED MONTH YEAR

LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA MARCH 1966

MARCH 1966

GREEN FLIGHT SUIT  
FLIGHT BOOTS  
FLIGHT JACKET  
HARD HAT  
LIFE VEST

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

NAME **(b) (6)** A/C **CL1** BUND **146019**

ENCLOSURE (7)

89.3

AN ABBREVIATED MOR (OPNAV FORM 3750/BJ) MAY BE SUBMITTED ON AN INDIVIDUAL WHEN ALL OF THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA ARE MET:

1. NO INJURY.
2. NO CAUSAL OR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR ATTRIBUTED TO THIS INDIVIDUAL.
3. NO PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL OR ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS, AS LISTED ON OPNAV FORM 3750/BC OF THE STANDARD MOR. (ALL SECTIONS APPLY.)
4. NO PERSONAL/SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT USAGE OR ATTEMPTED USAGE (OTHER THAN WEARING OF CLOTHING).
5. NO LACK OF REQUIRED PERSONAL EQUIPMENT OR CLOTHING.
6. NO PERSONAL EQUIPMENT OR CLOTHING PROBLEMS, DAMAGE OR FAILURE, AS LISTED ON OPNAV FORM 3750/BE (PAGE 2) OF THE STANDARD MOR.
7. NO EMERGENCY ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE, OTHER THAN STANDARD POST-FLIGHT EGRESS BY WAY OF NORMAL EXIT MEANS. EMERGENCY HATCH USED ONLY TO EXPEDITE EGRESS IS NOT AN EMERGENCY EGRESS.
8. NO EGRESS HAZARDS SUCH AS FIRE, GEAR BREAKING LOOSE IN AIRCRAFT, ABNORMAL AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE, ETC.
9. NO EGRESS DIFFICULTIES AS LISTED ON OPNAV FORM 3750/BF (PAGES 2 AND 3) OF THE STANDARD MOR.
10. NO SURVIVAL EPISODE.
11. NO RESCUE EPISODE.

## COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF SECTIONS I THROUGH V ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS PAGE ARE CONTAINED IN THE CURRENT EDITION OF OPNAVINST. 3750.6

FLIGHT SURGEON'S NAME AND GRADE

DUTY STATION

SIGNATURE

(b) (6)

CDR MC USN

NAP NAPLES

(b) (6)



RESUME OF FLIGHT TIME FOR LT. (b) (6) USNR, FOR LAST FIVE FISCAL YEARS

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ATTACHED	MODEL ACFT	FLT HOURS	CV LDGS D/N	OPERATIONAL/ PROFICIENCY
VT-31	1 JUL 64-1 NOV 64	TS2A	151	6/0	OPERATIONAL
VS-30	1 NOV 64-31 MAR 65	S2D	78	10/0	OPERATIONAL
VS-26	1 APR 65-30 JUN 65	S2D	101	10/0	OPERATIONAL
	1 JUL 65-15 MAY 66	S2D	290	17/6	OPERATIONAL
VR-24	16 MAY 66-30 JUN 66	C1A	57	5/6	OPERATIONAL
	1 JUL 66-30 JUN 67	C1A	398	41/3	OPERATIONAL
	1 JUL 67-30 JUN 68	C1A	428	39/6	OPERATIONAL
	1 JUL 68-22 MAR 69	C1A	309	21/6	OPERATIONAL

\* Pilot had no record of previous accidents.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH 8 PAVINST 875 6F

Enclosure (64)

RESUME OF FLIGHT TIME FOR CDR (b) (6) USN, FOR LAST FIVE FISCAL YEARS

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL ACFT	FIT HOURS	CV LDS D/N	OPERATIONAL/ PROFICIENCY
VAW 11	JUL 64- DEC 64	F4B	118	0/0	OPERATIONAL
NAS GLYNCO	JAN 65- JUN 65	Q1A	11	0/0	OPERATIONAL
		F4E	101	0/0	OPERATIONAL
		VC45J	12	0/0	OPERATIONAL
		F-39D	3	0/0	OPERATIONAL
		F-28	2	0/0	OPERATIONAL
NAS GLENCO	JUL 65- JUN 66	AP1B	120	0/0	OPERATIONAL
		VC45J	8	0/0	OPERATIONAL
		Q1A	1	0/0	OPERATIONAL
		F39D	6	0/0	OPERATIONAL
		Q3A	41	0/2	OPERATIONAL
NAS GLENCO	JUL 66- JUN 67	F8A	18	0/2	OPERATIONAL
		F39D	176	0/0	OPERATIONAL
NAS GLENCO	JUL 67- AUG 67	T39D	47	0/0	OPERATIONAL
COMCRUDEBARTOT 11	SEP 67- JUN 68	VC45J	23	0/0	PROFICIENCY
		T28	2	0/0	PROFICIENCY
COMCRUDEBARTOT 11	JUL 68- AUG 68		0	0/0	
VR-24 DET	SEP 68- MAR 69	Q1A	112	12/1	OPERATIONAL

\* Log book record indicates that in Oct 1952 while flying an F9F-5, the pilot dived for the carrier deck collapsing port landing gear due to hard, port wing down landing, charlie damage. Pitching deck was contributing factor.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH O'NAVINST 375J.6F


Enclosure (63)

Ref Fig 9  
End (BD)

Yoke Will Not  
Receive Roller

Yoke

Roller




Depicts Yoke After  
Quick Reversal To  
The Left.

Ref Fig 8  
Encl (80)


ENCLOSURE (80)






ENCLOSURE (80)

NORMAL SEQUENCE FOR SHIMMY DAMPER ROLLER AND YOKE




180° REVERSED

THE SEQUENCE WHICH RESULTS IN THE ROLLER AND YOKE BEING MISALIGNED



THEN A QUICK REVERSAL



THE FLUID DAMPENING EFFECT OF THE SHIMMY DAMPER RESULTS IN A TIME DELAY OF THE YOKE CENTERING WHEN IT LEAVES THE CAM, THEREFORE, THE RESULTS ARE DEPICTED IN FIGURES 7 & 8.

NNNNAOCJQZSCA655CZCSLA458

RFTEZYUW RUFTPIB0221 0311712-EEEE--RUCILSA.

DE RUFRSAD #1241 0311501

ZNY EEEEE

R 221501Z MAR 69

FM FLETACSUPPRON TWO FOUR DET NAPLES

TO RUENAAA/CNO

RUCILSA/NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

RUEBJUA/NAVAER

RUUKSAA/FLETACSUPPRON TWO FOUR ROTA

INFO RUCILWA/COMNAVAIRLANT -

RUFRSAA/COMFAIRMED

RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCONREPLANT

RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

PRELIMINARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT 1-69

A. OPNAVINST P3750.6 SERIES

1. C-1A BUNO 146019 FLEET TACTICAL SUPPORT SQUADRON  
TWENTY FOUR

2. 0103A, 22 MARCH 1969 AT NAF NAPLES, ITALY

3. 3A4 CARQUAL)

4. CHARLIE

5. AFTER CAT SHOT FROM CVA-33 (USS SHANGRI LA)

PAGE 2 RUFRSAD 1241 UNCLAS E F T O

WHEN GEAR WAS RETRACTED THE NOSE GEAR INDICATED  
UNSAFE. AFTER CYCLING NOSE GEAR REMAINED UNSAFE,  
AND COULD NOT BE LOWERED. VISUAL CHECK OF GEAR  
THRU COCKPIT DECK WINDOWS SHOWED GEAR COCKED IN  
THE WELL WITH GEAR DOORS JAMMING IT UP.

EFFORTS FAILED TO PUSH GEAR DOWN AND DECISION  
WAS MADE TO DIVERT ASHORE.

AIRCRAFT LANDED ON FOAMED RUNWAY, (1320'X 50'  
STARTING 3000' DOWN RUNWAY) RAN OFF FOAM AND  
STOPPED AFTER APPROX 200'.

SUSPECT AIRCRAFT WAS LAUNCHED WITH NOSE GEAR  
ROTATED 130 DEGREES.

6. (b) (6) USNR, 1315, ACTIVE

7. (b) (6) USN, 1310, ACTIVE,  
NONE, CO-PILOT.

8. NA

9. NA

BT

#1241

make

00	01	011	012	013	014	015	02	02A	02B	05	051
1	1		1	1			1			1	

TOR:

CHANNEL

NUMBER

655B

INIT: *mm*

DATE

055	10	11	12	13	20	33	40	50	60	70	80
A	1	1	1	1				1	1	1	1

ACTION  
AAR  
SUBST

RECEIVED  
SAFETY  
NAVAL  
CENTER  
22 MAR 69 19 50Z

CIA/146019

VR-24

1-69A

3-22-69

90322101  
MAR  
221501Z



NNNNU

HSWZFRFGQGIYCZCSLB404  
 RFTEZYUW RUFTPIB0275 0321342-EEEE--RUCILSA.  
 DE RUFRSAD #1262 0321154  
 ZNY EEEEE

R 231154Z MAR 69  
 FM FLETACSUPPRON TWO FOUR DET NAPLES  
 TO RUENAAA/CNO  
 RUCILSA/NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER  
 RUEBJUA/NAVAER  
 INFO/RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT  
 RUTNSYF/COMFAIRMED  
 RUTNSYF/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT  
 RUTNSYF/COMASWFOR SIXTHFLT  
 RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT  
 RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC  
 RUTKSAA/FLETACSUPPRON TWO FOUR ROTA  
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O

SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT 1-69

A. OPNAVINST P3750.6 SERIES

B. NY 221501Z MAR 69

1. C-1A BUNO 146019 FLEET TRACTICAL SUPPORT SQUADRON TWO FOUR., 674434, (b) (6) JR.
2. BINGO, FROM USS SHANGRI-LA TO NAVAL AIR FACILITY NAPLES, IFR,

PAGE 2 RUFRSAD 1262 UNCLAS E F T O  
 4.4 HOURS.

3. NOSE GEAR DOORS DESTROYED, GLADIATOR SHIELD BADLY DAMAGED, STRUT SISSORS CRACKED AND BENT, MINOR SKIN DAMAGE, SEVERAL STRINGERS AND SUPPORT BRACKETS IN NOSE WHEEL WELL BROKEN OR BENT, UP LOCK MECHANISM DAMAGED.

4. HUNG NOSE GEAR. LANDED ON RUNWAY 24, ON FOAMED AREA 1320 FT LONG, 40 FT WIDE STARTING 3030 FT FROM APPROACH END ON RIGHT SIDE OF RUNWAY. (PILOT REQUESTED FOAM IAW NATOPS) TOUCHDOWN. WAS AT 500-1000 FT FROM APPROACH END. COPILOT SUCURED AND FEATHERED BOTH ENGINES, NOSE FELL THRU AFTER 500 FT OF FOAMED AREA. FOAM WAS OVERRUN AND AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO SLIDE ON NOSE FOR 200 FT AFTER LEAVING FOAM. NO ARRESTING GEAR USSD.

5. FOLLOWING CVA CATAPULT LAUNCH, NOSE GEAR INDICATED UNSAFE WHEN RETRACTED. GEAR WAS CYCLED AND STILL INDICATED UNSAFE. PILOT THEN ATTEMPTED TO LOWER GEAR BUT NOSE GEAR DID NOT INDICATE DOWN. VISUAL INSPECTION REVEILED NOSE GEAR JAMMED THRU DOORS INTO WELL. EXTENSIVE EFFORTS FAILED TO DISLodge GEAR AND AIRCRAFT WAS DIVERTED TO NAVAL AIR FACILITY NAPLES. NOSE GEAR APPARENTLY IN A COCKED POSITION WHEN INITIAL RETRACTION OCCURED.

6. NAF WEATHER-3500 FT SCATTERED, 3000 FT OVERCAST, 10 MILES VIS,

PAGE 3 RUFRSAD 1262 UNCLAS E F T O  
 WIND 070/5KPH, TEMP 46F, DEW PT 36F.

7. SUSPECT NOSE WHEEL WAS ROTATED 183 DEGREES PRIOR TO LAUNCH.

8. N/A.

BT

#1262

CIA/146019

VRC-24 1-69A

3-22-69

/CORRECTED COPY/

SUPP AAR

00	01	011	012	013	014	015	02	02A	02B	05	051
1	1		1	1			1			1	
TOR: _____							CHANNEL NUMBER <b>724 B</b>				
INIT: <i>mf</i>							DATE _____				
055	10	11	12	13	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
	A	1	1	1				1	1	1	

23 MAR 69 14 32Z

RECEIVED  
NAVAL SAFETY  
CENTER

MAR

231154Z



NNNU

HSWZFRFGQGIYCZSLB404

RFTEZYUW RUFTPIB0275 0821342-EEEE--RUCILSA.

DE RUFRSAD #1262 3321154

ZNY EEEEE

R 231154Z MAR 69

FM FLETACSUPPRON TWO FOUR DET NAPLES

TO RUENAAA/CNO

RUCILSA/NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

RUEBJUA/NAVAER

INFO/RUCILNA/COMNAVAIRLANT

RUTNSYF/COMFAIRMED

RUTNSYF/COMASWSIXTHFLT

RUTNSYF/COMASWFORSIXTHFLT

RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT

RUWJMUUA/COMNAVAIRPAC

RUTKSAA/FLETACSUPPRON TWO FOUR ROTA

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT 1-69

A. OPNAVINST P3750.6 SERIES

B. NY 221501Z MAR 69

1. C-1A BUNO 146019 FLEET TRACTICAL SUPPORT SQUADRON TWO FOUR.,  
674434, (b) (6) JR.

2. BINGO, FROM USS SHANGRI-LA TO NAVAL AIR FACILITY NAPLES, IFR,

PAGE 2 RUFRSAD 1262 UNCLAS E F T O  
4.4 HOURS.3. NOSE GEAR DOORS DESTROYED, GLADIATOR SHIELD BADLY DAMAGED,  
STRUT SISSORS CRACKED AND BENT, MINOR SKIN DAMAGE, SEVERAL  
STRINGERS AND SUPPORT BRACKETS IN NOSE WHEEL WELL BROKEN OR  
BENT, UP LOCK MECHANISM DAMAGED.4. HUNG NOSE GEAR. LANDED ON RUNWAY 24, ON FOAMED AREA 1320 FT  
LONG, 40 FT WIDE STARTING 3000 FT FROM APPROACH END ON RIGHT  
SIDE OF RUNWAY. (PILOT REQUESTED FOAM IAW NATOPS) TOUCHDOWN.  
WAS AT 500-1000 FT FROM APPROACH END. COPILOT SUCURED AND  
FEATHERED BOTH ENGINES, NOSE FELL THRU AFTER 500 FT OF FOAMED  
AREA. FOAM WAS OVERRUN AND AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO SLIDE ON NOSE  
FOR 200 FT AFTER LEAVING FOAM. NO ARRESTING GEAR USSD.5. FOLLOWING CVA CATAPULT LAUNCH, NOSE GEAR INDICATED UNSAFE  
WHEN RETRACTED. GEAR WAS CYCLED AND STILL INDICATED UNSAFE.  
PILOT THEN ATTEMPTED TO LOWER GEAR BUT NOSE GEAR DID NOT INDICATE  
DOWN. VISUAL INSPECTION REVEILED NOSE GEAR JAMMED THRU DOORS INTO  
WELL. EXTENSIVE EFFORTS FAILED TO DISLODGE GEAR AND AIRCRAFT WAS  
DIVERTED TO NAVAL AIR FACILITY NAPLES. NOSE GEAR APPARENTLY IN A  
COCKED POSITION WHEN INITIAL RETRACTION OCCURED.

6. NAF WEATHER-3500 FT SCATTERED, 3000 FT OVERCAST, 10 MILES VIS,

PAGE 3 RUFRSAD 1262 UNCLAS E F T O

WIND 070/6MPH, TEMP 46F, DEW PT 36F.

7. SUSPECT NOSE WHEEL WAS ROTATED 180 DEGREES PRIOR TO LAUNCH.

8. N/A.

BT

#1262

C/A/146019

VRC-24 1-69A

3-22-69

SUPP AAR

00	01	011	012	013	014	015	02	02A	02B	05	051
1	1		1	1			1				1

TOR: \_\_\_\_\_ CHANNEL NUMBER **724 B**

INIT: *mf* DATE \_\_\_\_\_

055	10	11	12	13	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
A	1	1	1	1				1	1	1	

23 MAR 69 14 34Z

RECEIVED  
NAVAL  
CENTER  
SAFETY

MAR

231154Z